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economic and financial crisis revealed the shortcomings of the asymmetric EMU. 
The present study assesses the unused potential of the existing Treaty chapter in 
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to switch the perspective on the Treaty potential from competences to 
compliance. By identifying the lack of mechanisms in the existing economic policy 
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Member State’s incapacity to comply, the study suggests the introduction of an 
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capacity (for the medium term) within the existing Treaties. Furthermore, the 
establishment of the Eurozone budget, of a Redemption Fund or the adoption of 
a convergence code is discussed. By the same token, the legal inclusion of the 
Fiscal Compact and the ESM-Treaty is examined and concrete proposals are 
developed. Finally, the study addresses ways of increasing the accountability and 
legitimacy in EMU affairs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) became after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty the chapter that received the most attention of all Treaty chapters. The economic and 
financial crisis that broke out in 2008 revealed the shortcomings of the existing Treaty 
provisions and forced the Union legislator to adopt far-reaching secondary law in order to 
compensate for these shortcomings. Consequently, much attention is paid to the possibilities 
left within the Treaty boundaries to reform EMU and to proposals for a future Treaty change 
to make EMU workable. 
 
The present study takes first a look at the state-of-art of EMU, the changes that the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced and the new economic governance that was created by the so-called ‘six 
pack’ and ‘two pack’ legislation. Based on an analysis of the state-of-art, this study assesses 
to which extent additional improvements of the economic governance can be achieved within 
the Treaty boundaries. By that, the study throws a light on the unused potential of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Furthermore, where the Treaty boundaries are reached, the present study will 
develop proposals for future Treaty amendments in order to realise improvements. 
 
In order to bring out concrete proposals that can still be implemented within the existing 
Treaties, a change of perspective is presently proposed: From competences to compliance. 
The legal bases in the EMU chapter have only a limited scope. The well-known asymmetry of 
EMU does not allow for setting legally binding policy goals for Member States’ national 
economic and fiscal policies. By that, a perspective based on competences will quickly reach 
the Treaty boundaries. Yet, if one takes a perspective based on compliance, one realises that 
legally binding rules are only one way of achieving compliance with policy goals set at Union 
level. If a Member State is breaching Union law, the latter takes precedence over the non-
compliant national law and can be enforced by (national and European) courts. In the current 
system of economic policy coordination, this method of achieving compliance is excluded 
because of the intergovernmental nature of the economic policy coordination. A perspective 
based on competences must now come to the conclusion that the shortcomings of the current 
EMU require a Treaty change. A perspective based on compliance, however, unveils the 
unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of economic policy coordination. The 
perspective based on compliance looks from the policy goals set by ‘soft law’ instruments 
such as the broad guidelines to the result to be achieved, which is an adaption of national 
economic and fiscal policies to the policy goals set at EU level. If the Union may now introduce 
different kinds of mechanisms to achieve compliance than the ones in place within the Treaty 
boundaries, further deepening of the EMU without Treaty change may be achieved. Under 
the heading of strengthening compliance (Chapter 2), the present study discusses the 
introduction of a convergence code (section 2.3), an incentive-based enforcement 
mechanism of economic policy coordination and the idea of an EMU fiscal capacity (section 
2.1). Inherently linked to the two latter is the idea of establishing a Euro area budget 
(section 2.2). At hand, it is proposed to take the capability of a Member State to be compliant 
more into consideration when improving the current legal framework, whilst it will be 
established that the current system to achieve compliance in economic policy coordination is 
primarily based on addressing a Member State’s will not to comply. When focussing at a 
Member State’s capability to comply, the question of how to deal with past excessive 
government debt of the Member States and, by that, the idea of a European Redemption 
Fund (section 2.4) and, by the same token, the question of how to avoid future excessive 
indebtedness and, by that, the inclusion of the Fiscal Compact into EU law (section 2.5) 
are to be addressed. The chapter demonstrates that significant elements of these ideas can 
already be implemented on the basis of the existing Treaties if designed in a certain manner.  
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Chapter 3 discusses proposals that seek to modify the institutional structure of EMU. In this 
context, the study examines the suggested strengthening of the ECJ in the budgetary 
surveillance procedure (section 3.1) and the introduction of an EU Finance Minister 
(section 3.2). Both institutional changes require, from a legal perspective, Treaty changes in 
order to be realised. From a political perspective, the present contribution raises several 
reservations. Finally, the inclusion of the ESM-Treaty into the EU legal framework 
(section 3.3) calls for significant institutional changes, whilst the substance could also be 
introduced into the current EU law without Treaty change. Seeing, however, the impact of 
the ESM on European as well as national policy and decision-making, it is presently suggested 
to only include the ESM into the EU law by a Treaty amendment. 
 
Lastly, the issue of democratic accountability of the decision-making in EMU affairs and the 
legitimacy of decisions taken is addressed in chapter 4. Applying an analytical framework 
(section 4.1) that consists of two elements (foundations of accountability and instruments of 
accountability) to the state of affairs with regard to accountability in the area of EMU, one 
has to conclude that the European Parliament as the forum that holds the actors in EMU to 
account has no sufficient instruments of accountability. There is only the Economic Dialogue 
besides the standard accountability instruments of the European Parliament such as the set 
up a of temporary committee of inquiry, a motion of censure or the veto of the Union budget. 
Furthermore, even the foundations of accountability are precarious since there is only a 
comprehensive obligation to inform the European Parliament on EMU affairs on the parts of 
the European Commission and to a somewhat lesser extent on the parts of the Council. There 
are only minor information obligations on the parts of the European Council and the 
Eurogroup. Chapter 4 therefore examines ways to enhance the accountability of the 
Eurogroup (section 4.2), which includes the extension of the information obligations for the 
European Commission within the Economic and Dialogue to the Eurogroup, the inclusion of 
the Eurogroup into Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on public access to documents and the 
possibility to elect the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs as president of the 
Eurogroup. Furthermore, several proposals for enhancing instruments of accountability 
for the European Parliament are discussed (section 4.3) such as the extension of the 
ordinary legislative procedure to matters of economic and fiscal affairs, the potential of 
concluding interinstitutional agreements and of concluding an agreement with the ESM or the 
establishment of a new Parliamentary body in Eurozone matters. Covered by this discussion 
is also a proposal to use Union agencies as instruments to increase accountability and 
legitimacy of European decisions. This proposal refers to the increasing importance of uniform 
implementation of harmonised rules. The possibility for the Union legislator to confer 
executive powers upon Union agencies, as confirmed by the ECJ, gives the Union legislator 
the opportunity to intensify supervision of the Union’s executive action. 
 
In conclusion, Annex II presents a proposal for Treaty changes that are required in order to 
realise the policy options discussed by this study. 
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1. ANALYSIS OF THE STATE-OF-THE-ART 
1.1. Economic Union 
1.1.1. Changes in the Lisbon Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty did not change much in the chapter on Economic Union compared to the 
previous Treaty. It introduced the ordinary legislative procedure in Article 121(6) TFEU for 
adopting measures in relation to the multilateral surveillance procedure. It, furthermore, 
included chapter 4 on ‘provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the euro’ com-
prising Articles 136 to 138 TFEU. The budgetary surveillance procedure remained untouched, 
whereas in Article 121(4) TFEU the Commission got a new instrument in the multilateral 
surveillance procedure, which is the possibility to directly address a warning to the Member 
State concerned. Finally, the reference to the “spirit of solidarity between Member States” in 
Article 122(1) TFEU was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
1.1.2. New Economic Governance 
The Treaty of Lisbon did not change the basic construction of the Economic and Monetary 
Union as it was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The basic construction is characterised 
by its asymmetry. Whilst the Monetary Union is a supranational one, the Economic Union 
remains intergovernmental. This division is in line with the traditional rather technocratic EU 
policy approach: Disciplining national democracies by a common monetary policy instead of 
replacing their decisions by a common economic and fiscal policy. National economic and 
fiscal policies should be aligned with certain policy goals set at EU level but without any 
legally binding enforcement mechanism. They should be disciplined by the markets based on 
the assumption that, as long as the position of a Member State on the financial markets is 
the same as of any other private institution, markets will indicate in form of decreasing or 
increasing interest rates on government bonds whether a national economic and fiscal policy 
is convincing or not. Therefore the no-bail-out clause (Article 125 TFEU), therefore no pur-
chase of government bonds on primary markets by central banks (Article 123 TFEU), there-
fore no privileged access by central governments to financial institutions (Article 124 TFEU). 
The coordination of Member States’ economic and fiscal policies was depoliticised at EU level 
by definition.  
 
The main institution in the Monetary Union is the European Central Bank (ECB) equipped with 
an independence vis-à-vis any other Union institution and vis-à-vis national governments 
and Parliaments when carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon it by the Treaties. 
The main institution in the Economic Union is the Council. It coordinates, mostly upon rec-
ommendation of the Commission, the economic policies of the Member States and it exercises 
the budget control under the excessive deficit procedure. The European Parliament has no 
major role in the supranational Monetary Union because of the independence of the ECB. It 
has no major role in the Economic Union either because of its intergovernmental nature. 
National Parliaments have no role in the Monetary Union since conducting the monetary pol-
icy is an exclusive EU competence. In addition, with regard to matters concerning the Eco-
nomic Union national Parliaments are in an ‘international law modus’ and, traditionally, con-
trol their governments ex post. 
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This basic construction of the EMU cannot be changed outside a formal Treaty change proce-
dure. This sets the limits for secondary law such as the ‘Six Pack’1 or the ‘Two Pack’2 regula-
tions as well as for international treaties concluded by a subset of Member States such as 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG) and the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM-Treaty). The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) confirmed this view in its ‘Pringle’ decision on the compati-
bility of the ESM-Treaty with EU law when it concluded that the ESM-Treaty could enter into 
force even before the formal introduction of the third paragraph of Article 136 into the TFEU, 
which stated that the Eurozone Member States might establish a stability mechanism (ECJ 
2012b: para. 185). Independently of this ‘Treaty change’, the ESM-Treaty had to comply with 
the EU Treaties in order to be lawful.  
 
The unchanged asymmetry of the EMU at the level of the Treaties means that the Treaty 
boundaries are reached when the coordination of Member States’ economic and fiscal policies 
is to be supranationalised. Such supranationalisation can be assumed if decisions taken at 
European level may substitute economic and fiscal policy decisions taken at national level.  
This does, however, not lead to the conclusion that a Treaty change is inevitable in order to 
strengthen the European dimension of the Economic Union. There is still a potential within 
the Treaty boundaries. In order to uncover this potential, one should change the perspective 
of analysis from competences to compliance.  
1.1.3. Means to ensure compliance under the current rules of the Economic Governance 
One can distinguish five means to ensure compliance: First, there can be private enforce-
ment. Private action builds up pressure on the non-compliant Member State and pushes the 
latter to modify its economic and fiscal policy decisions. Second, there can be public enforce-
ment. Within public enforcement, one may distinguish several degrees of intensity. The least 
intense means of enforcement is ‘naming and shaming’. A publication of non-compliance 
creates public pressure on the non-compliant Member State to align its economic and fiscal 
policies with the commonly set policy goals. There can be, third, sanctions for non-compli-
ance, and, fourth, incentives for compliance. Fifth, and this is the most intense means to 
ensure compliance, European policy decisions substitute national economic and fiscal policy 
decisions. Non-compliance is then ‘sanctioned’ by substitution.  
 
Out of these means, only the latter is excluded by the non-supranational nature of the Eco-
nomic Union. The current choice of the Treaties is a combination of private enforcement and 
‘naming and shaming’. As already mentioned, higher interest rates on government bonds 
should make Member States modify their national policy choices. Publicly naming wrong pol-
icy choices should then reinforce or even trigger such private reactions. A closer look at the 
                                           
1 The ‘Six Pack’ consists of five regulations and one directive: Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on the effective en-
forcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/1; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 on enforce-
ment measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011 L 306/8; Regulation (EU) 
No 1175/2011 amending Council Regulation (EU) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L 306/12; Regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L 306/25; Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1177/2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L 306/33; Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frame-
works of the Member States, OJ 2011 L 306/41. 
2 The ‘Two Pack’ consists of two regulations: Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
respect to their financial stability, OJ 2013, L 140/1, and Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member 
States in the euro area, OJ 2013, L 140/11. 
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evolution of sovereign bond yields for euro area countries in the period between the intro-
duction of the euro in 1999 and today reveals that this mechanism did not function properly. 
Until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the yield curves of all euro area Member 
States converged at the yield level of German government bonds independently of the sus-
tainability of a Member State’s fiscal and economic policies (Kilponen et al. 2015: 289). Af-
terwards the yield spreads between the several government bonds broadened dramatically 
with a peak in June 2012 of an interest rate of 27.82 % on Greek government bonds com-
pared to 1.30 % percent on German government bonds.3 This development, which does not 
reflect the state of national fiscal and economic policies, reveals the shortcomings of the 
predominant enforcement mechanism in EMU matters, which is private enforcement. Finan-
cial market operators did not take the sustainability of these policies into account when cal-
culating their risk. They did not send any signals to governments to change their policies.  
 
Financial sanctions for non-compliance are explicitly foreseen by Article 126(11) TFEU in case 
a Member State whose currency is the Euro fails to put into practice the Council recommen-
dation on remedying an established excessive government deficit within a specified time 
limit. Outside of Article 126(11) TFEU, the Treaties do not provide for any sanctions except 
for cases of non-compliance with judgments of the European Court of Justice (Article 260(2) 
TFEU) and in case of a ‘serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values re-
ferred to in Article 2 [TEU]’ (Article 7(3) TEU). Yet, financial sanctions were introduced by 
the ‘Six Pack’ for Eurozone Member States. Regulations based on Articles 121(6) and 136 
TFEU provide for interest-bearing deposits in case of a violation of the preventive arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011) or in case of a non-
correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances (Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011). The latter can even be topped up by fines (Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011). Finally, already at an earlier stage of the excessive deficit procedure, non-in-
terest bearing deposits can be required from a Member State that already lodged an interest-
bearing deposit because of the violation of the preventive arm of the SGP once an excessive 
government deficit is established in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU (Article 4(1) of Reg-
ulation (EU) No 1173/2011). Furthermore, according to Article 23(9) of Regulation 
1303/2013 on common provisions of the European Structural and Investment Funds, the 
Council may suspend part or all of the commitments or payments for programmes of a Mem-
ber State concerned where the Council decides that the Member State has not taken effective 
action to correct its excessive deficit, has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan, has 
not taken recommended actions in order to remedy an excessive macroeconomic imbalance 
or did not comply with the macroeconomic adjustment programme under Regulation (EU) No 
472/2013. 
 
The legality of those sanctions is doubtful. This follows from the fact that Primary law provides 
explicitly in Article 126(11) TFEU for sanctions against non-compliant Member States within 
the corrective arm of the Stability Growth Pact. This means in turn that there cannot be 
sanctions for Member States where Primary law does not provide for it and, consequently, 
that they cannot be introduced by Secondary law. These limits set by Primary law can also 
not be overcome by Article 136 TFEU, as will be explained under section 1.1.4.2. In addition 
to this legal argument, one may question the meaningfulness of a financial sanction with a 
view to persuade a Member State in economic and financial troubles to modify its economic 
and fiscal policies. 
 
Finally, the last remaining mechanism to ensure compliance, which are incentives, is not yet 
explored by the Union legislator. Instead of sanctioning non-compliance, one may reward 
                                           
3 Data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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compliance. Elements of an incentive-based compliance mechanism can be found in Article 
14 of the ESM-Treaty, according to which the ESM board of governors may decide to grant 
precautionary financial assistance. This assistance ‘aims at helping ESM Members whose eco-
nomic conditions are still sound to maintain continuous access to market financing by rein-
forcing the credibility of their macroeconomic performance while ensuring an adequate safety 
net’ (Article 1 of the ESM Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance). The possibility of 
introducing an incentive-based enforcement mechanism within the Treaty legal framework 
on EMU is further explored in the next chapter under 2.1. 
1.1.4. The use of instruments of differentiated integration 
Since the Economic Union is, in essence, an intergovernmental Union, its deepening without 
Treaty change requires unanimous decisions in the Council. The power of a single Member 
State to rise a veto for reasons whatsoever undermines any attempts of deepening the Eco-
nomic Union. Therefore, the TSCG already made reference in its Article 10 to ‘to make active 
use, whenever appropriate and necessary, of measures specific to those Member States 
whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 [TFEU] and of enhanced cooperation 
as provided for in Article 20 [TEU] and in Articles 326 to 334 [TFEU] on matters that are 
essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal mar-
ket.’ Against this background, the current framework of means for differentiated integration 
shall be assessed with a view to their potential to deepen the Economic Union at least for a 
subset of Member States if another Member State blocks any further integration within the 
Treaty boundaries by raising its veto. The current legal framework provides for an enhanced 
cooperation of a subset of Member States (1.1.4.1), for measures specific to Euro area Mem-
ber States under Article 136 TFEU (1.1.4.2) and, under International law, for international 
agreements amongst a subset of Member States (1.1.4.3). 
1.1.4.1. The use of Enhanced Cooperation in terms Article 20 TEU 
The role model for a cooperation of a subset of Member States with a view to adopt legally 
binding rules is the Enhanced Cooperation in terms of Article 20 TEU. First, the procedural 
requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation will be addressed before turning to 
the substantive ones. 
1.1.4.1.1. Procedural requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation 
The procedure for establishing an enhanced cooperation is a three-step-procedure with, first, 
the authorisation procedure, second, the legislative procedure and, third, the participation 
procedure. In order to establish an enhanced cooperation between them, a subgroup of at 
least nine Member States has to submit a request to the European Commission, which may 
propose a decision authorising the enhanced cooperation to the Council. The decision whether 
or not the Commission will present such a proposal remains at the discretion of the Commis-
sion. The Council adopts, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, a decision 
with qualified majority amongst all EU Member States. The adoption of this decision is linked 
to two conditions: First, the objectives of the requested enhanced cooperation cannot be 
attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole and, second, this decision shall 
be adopted as a last resort.  
 
In its recent decision on the legality of the enhanced cooperation concerning the creation of 
unitary patent protection (ECJ 2013) the European Court of Justice had the opportunity to 
specify both criteria. With regard to the impossibility to legislate with effect to the entire 
Union ‘the impossibility referred to may [according to the ECJ] be due to various causes, for 
example, lack of interest on the part of one or more Member States or the inability of the 
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Member States, who have all shown themselves interested in the adoption of an arrangement 
at Union level, to reach agreement on the content of that arrangement.’  
 
‘The expression “as a last resort” highlights [for the European Court of Justice] the fact that 
only those situations in which it is impossible to adopt legislation in the foreseeable future 
may give rise to the adoption of a decision authorising enhanced cooperation.’ However, not 
any ‘fruitless negotiation could lead to one or more instances of enhanced cooperation, to 
the detriment of the search for a compromise enabling the adoption of legislation for the 
Union as a whole.’ The authorising decision is therefore a ‘balancing act’ between the duty 
and need for negotiations with all EU Member States aimed at reaching a compromise, on 
the one hand, and the determination of a failure of these negotiations, on the other. The 
Council has a wide margin of political discretion for the determination whether or not to 
authorise the establishment of an enhanced cooperation.  
 
On the basis on this authorising decision the participating Member States may proceed with 
the legislative procedure. Decision-making is modified, according to Article 330 TFEU, with 
regard to the Council, but explicitly not with regard to the European Parliament. All Member 
States may participate in the deliberations, but only the participating ones shall take part in 
the vote. The European Parliament, however, votes in its full composition.  
 
Finally, once a non-participating Member State wishes to join an established enhanced coop-
eration, this Member State has to notify its intention to the Commission and the Council. The 
Commission either confirms the participation or indicates arrangements to be adopted in 
order to fulfil certain conditions for participation and sets a deadline. If after the expiry of 
this deadline the Commission still considers that the conditions are not yet met, the non-
participating Member State may request a Council vote on the participation. 
1.1.4.1.2. Substantive requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation 
With regard to the substantive requirements for establishing an enhanced cooperation, such 
cooperation shall not undermine the internal market and shall not constitute a discrimination 
based on grounds of nationality. It must therefore be in conformity with Primary as well as 
with existing Secondary law. This ‘non-regression’ with regard to the current state of Union 
law is furthermore combined with an obligation to only act in order to advance the Union. 
Enhanced cooperation is therefore only possible if it serves exclusively a better and quicker 
integration without harming the rights of non-participating Member States. Finally, an en-
hanced cooperation can only be established within the framework of the Union’s non-exclu-
sive competences. This means that all Union competences, which are not listed in Article 3(1) 
TFEU on the Union’s exclusive competences, are suitable for the establishment of an en-
hanced cooperation, including Article 352(1) TFEU.  
1.1.4.2. Article 136 TFEU 
The European Parliament assigned a significant potential to Article 136 TFEU. In its resolution 
on the draft European Council decision amending Article 136 TFEU with regard to the ESM, 
the European Parliament considered that the ESM could have been established within the 
framework of the existing Treaties either on the basis of Article 136 TFEU or on the basis of 
Article 352 TFEU in conjunction with Articles 133 and 136 TFEU (cf. Point No. 9 of P7_TA 
(2011)0103).  
 
A closer look at the wording of Article 136 TFEU, however, reveals that the potential of Article 
136 TFEU is less significant than the European Parliament assumed. It states that ‘in order 
to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union […], the Council shall, in 
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accordance with the relevant procedure from among those referred to in Articles 121 and 
126 […], adopt measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro to 
either strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline or to set out 
economic policy guidelines for them, while ensuring that they […] are kept under surveil-
lance.’ This is an institutionalised form of an enhanced cooperation where the authorisation 
is given to the Euro area-Member States by means of Primary law and where the procedure 
for joining this enhanced cooperation is covered by Article 140 TFEU. As legal acts of any 
other enhanced cooperation, measures based on Article 136 TFEU have to comply with Pri-
mary law and may not modify it. This is confirmed by the wording of Article 136(1) TFEU, 
which requires act adopted on its basis to be ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
the Treaties’. This means that measures based on Article 136 TFEU may not modify Primary 
law (Häde 2011: 25). 
 
The Primary law authorisation for the establishment of an enhanced cooperation in Article 
136 TFEU is, furthermore, limited to the legal bases in Articles 121 and 126 TFEU. A closer 
look makes clear that only the legal base in Article 121(6) TFEU for the adoption of detailed 
rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure has a potential that was already used with 
the adoption of the ‘six pack’ and the ‘two pack’-legislation. However, already the ‘six pack’-
legislation crossed in the limits set by Primary law. The so-called reversed qualified majority 
voting, according to which a Commission recommendation is deemed to be adopted unless 
the Council decides by qualified majority to reject it, modifies the majority voting in the 
Council as prescribed by Article 16(3) TEU. Since Primary law cannot be modified on the basis 
of Article 136 TFEU, the reversed qualified majority voting cannot be considered to be covered 
by this legal base. (Repasi 2013: 70) All in all the potential of Article 136 TFEU is little. It is 
linked to the reach of the multilateral surveillance procedure.  
 
A second disadvantage is the fact that Article 136 TFEU is limited to Euro area Member States. 
The example of the banking union shows, however, that economic policy measures not only 
concern non-Euro area Member States but that they also want to participate in shaping those 
measures, which would be excluded by this Article. 
1.1.4.3. International Agreements (inter se-agreements) 
With the rise of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 international agreements were used 
more frequently in order to adopt binding rules for a subset of Member States. This intergov-
ernmental method of law-making was used when concluding the Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, also known as ‘Fiscal 
Compact’) (25 Member States), the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM-Treaty) (19 Member States) and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Res-
olution Fund (SRF Agreement) (26 Member States). 
 
International agreements concluded by a subset of Member States (inter se agreements) 
remain subject to EU law (Repasi 2013: 45). Even though the conclusion of the EU Treaties 
does not limit the international Treaty-making capacity of the Member States in areas cov-
ered by the EU Treaties, the Treaties provide for rules pre-empting the use of this Treaty-
making capacity. Firstly, international agreements concluded by a subset of Member States 
may not modify Primary law because their conclusion would violate Article 48 TEU. Secondly, 
international agreements have to be in compliance with existing primary and secondary EU 
law. They cannot modify existing rules. Thirdly, within the scope of Union competences, in-
ternational agreements are pre-empted insofar as they concern subject matters covered by 
exclusive Union competences (Article 2(1), 3(1) TFEU). Insofar as they concern subject-mat-
ters covered by shared competences, international agreements are pre-empted to the extent 
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that the Union has exercised them (Article 2(2), 4 TFEU). In case of directives, the pre-
emptive effect begins with the entry into force of the directive. As the only exception to these 
rules, Member States may conclude international agreements as ‘trustees of the common 
interest’ in the absence of appropriate action of the Council, when the adoption of measures 
is necessary (ECJ 1981). These must, however, be interim measures and to be suspended 
once Union measures are adopted. 
 
Furthermore, the principle of sincere cooperation as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, the prin-
ciple of institutional balance (Article 13 TEU), the principle of democracy (Article 10 TEU) and 
the rights of the Commission under Article 291(2) TFEU limit the use of the Treaty-making 
capacities of the Member States.  
1.1.4.3.1. Principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) 
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, established in Article 4(3) TEU, Member 
States are required, inter alia, to refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the at-
tainment of the Union’s objectives and which could thwart the EU legal order. The system of 
checks and balances between the Member States, represented by the Council, and the EU, 
represented by the European Commission and the European Parliament, is part of the con-
stitutional core of the EU legal order. If, therefore, the adoption of a Union legal act is legally 
possible on the basis of a Union competence which refers, in particular, to the ordinary leg-
islative procedure, such an act shall be adopted on the basis of this competence.  
 
If it were at Member States’ discretion to choose between, on the one hand, the conclusion 
of an international agreement, which is drafted by the Member States, negotiated by the 
Member States without any kind of formal involvement of the Commission and the European 
Parliament and, on the other hand, the adoption of a legal act, in accordance with the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, where the proposal is exclusively drafted by the European Com-
mission and where the European Parliament has the right to amend and to block any kind of 
provision, the whole system of checks and balances would be rendered meaningless. Member 
States are therefore under a legal obligation to sincerely respect the Union legislative proce-
dures foreseen by a Union competence if the conditions for the use of this competence are 
fulfilled and the legislative procedure is initiated by a Commission proposal. 
1.1.4.3.2. Principle of institutional balance and the principle of democracy 
The European Court of Justice, furthermore, consistently held that the Parliamentary partic-
ipation rights in legislative procedures ‘provided for by the Treaty constitutes an essential 
formal requirement breach of which renders the measure concerned void. Effective partici-
pation of the Parliament in the legislative process of the Community, in accordance with the 
procedures laid down by the Treaty, represents an essential factor in the institutional balance 
intended by the Treaty. This function reflects the fundamental democratic principle that the 
people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly’ (ECJ 1997: para. 14; ECJ 1995: para. 17). 
1.1.4.3.3. Starting point of standstill obligations of Member States 
Yet, Article 2(2) TFEU states that, in the case of shared competences, Member States remain 
free to act as long as the Union did not legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. 
Member States shall, however, also refrain from any measures, which may circumvent the 
legislative procedure under the ‘Community method’. The important question is therefore 
from which moment on Member States are not free anymore to conclude an International 
agreement instead of adopting an EU legal act under the ordinary legislative procedure. This 
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problem is not yet decided by the ECJ. The European Court of Justice, however, decided 
already in cases of external action of the EU where the same conflict between concerted EU 
action on the one hand and Member States’ freedom to conclude International Treaties on 
the other occurs. In a recent case, the ECJ decided that, first, the ‘duty of genuine coopera-
tion [Article 4(3) TEU] is of general application and does not depend either on whether the 
Community competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of the Member States to enter 
into obligations …’. Second, ‘where it is apparent that the subject matter of an agreement or 
convention falls partly within the competence of the Community […], it is essential to ensure 
close cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, both in the 
process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into.’ 
Third, ‘the Court has held that Member States are subject to special duties of action and 
abstention in a situation in which the Commission has submitted to the Council proposals 
which, although they have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure 
for concerted Community action’ (ECJ 2010A: para. 71 to 74). 
 
Therefore, standstill obligations of Member States with regard to an alternative conclusion of 
an international agreement start once the Commission presented the proposal for a legal act 
on the basis of a legal base, which provides for the ordinary legislative procedure. 
1.1.4.3.4. Legal framework for the conclusion of intergovernmental inter se agreements 
in EMU matters and the existing Treaties 
In sum, intergovernmental agreements amongst EU Member States in EMU matters are le-
gally valid under the following conditions: 
 
1. Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not modify Primary law if concluded outside 
of Article 48 TEU; 
2. Intergovernmental inter se agreements have to be in compliance with existing Primary 
and Secondary law; 
3. Intergovernmental inter se agreements are pre-empted within the scope of 
a) exclusive Union competences or of 
b) shared Union competences to the extent that the Union has exercised them; in case 
of directives the pre-emptive effect begins with the entry into force of the directive; 
4. Intergovernmental inter se agreements of all Member States may only be concluded if a 
Union legislative procedure failed or is likely to fail; 
5. Intergovernmental inter se agreements of a subset of Member States may only be con-
cluded if an Enhanced Cooperation failed of is likely to fail; 
6. Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not circumvent Union legislative procedures 
if there is a Commission proposal on the basis of a shared Union competence; 
7. Intergovernmental inter se agreements may not affect the enjoyment by the other parties 
of their rights under the EU Treaties; therefore the use of Union procedures and Union 
institutions by the inter se cooperation is subject to the approval of all Member States. 
1.1.5. The role of the Eurogroup 
From a purely legal perspective, the role of the Eurogroup is a minor one. According to Pro-
tocol (No 14) of the Lisbon Treaty on the Eurogroup, the main task of the Eurogroup is merely 
‘to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities they [the ministers of Eurozone 
Member States] share with regard to the single currency’. The Eurogroup is an informal body. 
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It is no Union institution. It cannot adopt legally binding decisions. This was recently con-
firmed by a series of orders by the General Court dismissing applications to annul a decision 
of the Eurogroup concerning Cypriot banks in March 2013 (GC 2014). The General Court 
clearly stated that decisions of the Eurogroup do not produce legal effects. The complete 
absence of the Eurogroup in the law making of the Union and its inability to adopt legally 
binding decisions explains why the Lisbon Treaty did not provide for a mechanism to hold the 
Eurogroup to account for its action. There is, under Primary law, no legal obligation of the 
Eurogroup to inform the public or other institutions about its activities and there are no 
transparency rules for the Eurogroup. There are no minutes of Eurogroup meetings. Only 
brief summaries are sent to the participants of these meetings. The president of the Eu-
rogroup has not to be afraid of any consequences attached to a negative assessment of the 
performance of the Eurogroup. 
 
Yet, such a lack of accountability can be tolerated, from a legal point of view, with regard to 
a purely informal gathering of ministers that exchange their views. This understanding of the 
Eurogroup can, however, not any longer be upheld for the Eurogroup as it stands today after 
the rise of the financial and economic crisis in 2008.  
1.1.5.1. The new role of the Eurogroup in the anti-crisis legislation 
Originally, the Treaties did not foresee any formal role in the EU economic governance for 
the Eurogroup. However, already the pre-crisis Eurogroup was called at the time of its es-
tablishment ‘the sketch of a European Economic Government’ (Strauss-Kahn 1998: 1). With 
the adoption of the so-called ‘Six Pack’ regulations, the Eurogroup got a formal role in the 
new economic governance framework that was established by these regulations. In the ‘Mac-
roeconomic Imbalances Procedure’ (MIP), the European Commission has now to inform the 
Eurogroup about its measures. The Commission annual report is discussed by the Eurogroup 
and the Commission has to take due account of this discussion when undertaking an in-depth 
review of a Member State. In the ‘Two Pack’ regulations, two years later, the role of the 
Eurogroup was further strengthened. Eurozone Member States have now to submit their draft 
budgetary plans and their national debt issuance plans not only to the Commission but also 
to the Eurogroup for monitoring and assessment. The Commission presents its opinion on 
the draft budgetary plans to the Eurogroup, which afterwards discusses the budgetary situ-
ation in each Member State. The results of those discussions are to be made public where 
appropriate.  
 
If one now detaches the perception of the Eurogroup from the legal texts and includes in the 
broader picture those fora in which the same persons take decisions that come together in 
the Eurogroup, one has to come to the conclusion that the Eurogroup today has as a forum 
that bundles different discussions a significant de facto role in the economic governance 
framework. Not only does the Eurogroup discuss draft budgetary plans and national debt 
issuance plans of Eurozone Member States, but the same persons forming the Eurogroup 
decide as ‘ESM Board of Governors’ on ESM financial assistance programmes and vote as 
‘ECOFIN Council’ on decisions and recommendations to Eurozone Member States under the 
multilateral surveillance and the budgetary control procedure. Taking into account that the 
Eurogroup meets regularly the day before the official ECOFIN meeting, discussions and de-
cisions on those subjects can be preponed to the informal Eurogroup meeting and be ‘rub-
berstamped’ by the subsequent ECOFIN Council meeting. 
 
This de facto crucial role of the Eurogroup as a body is supplemented by the fact that not 
only the European Commission, represented by the Commissioner for Economic and Mone-
tary Affairs, but also the European Central Bank (ECB), mostly represented by its president, 
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participates in Eurogroup meetings. The latter does not only create tensions with the ECB’s 
independence in conducting the Union’s monetary policy but raises also questions about the 
degree to which the ECB influences political decisions that are to be taken outside of its policy 
mandate – a problem that was pointed out recently by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his 
opinion in the OMT case (Opinion of 14 January in Case C-62/14, OMT, No 144 et seqq.). 
1.1.5.2. Legal Problems related to the strong de facto role of the Eurogroup 
The strong position of the Eurogroup, which goes beyond a simple ‘sketch of a European 
Economic Government’, gives rise not only to significant accountability problems, which will 
be addressed under section 4.2. It also leads to legal problems. The European Court of Justice 
decided in case C-27/04, Commission v Council (ECJ 2004) that the economic governance 
procedures explicitly foreseen by the Treaties cannot be undermined: ‘It follows from the 
wording and the broad logic of the system established by the Treaty that the Council cannot 
break free from the rules laid down by Article 104 EC [today’s Article 126 TFEU] and those 
which it set for itself in Regulation No 1467/97. Thus, it cannot have recourse to an alterna-
tive procedure, for example in order to adopt a measure which would not be the very decision 
envisaged at a given stage or which would be adopted in conditions different from those 
required by the applicable provisions’ (ECJ 2004: para. 81). This refers in particular to the 
exclusion of non-Eurozone Member States from deliberations concerning decisions under the 
multilateral surveillance and the budget control procedure. A simple ‘rubberstamp function’ 
of the ECOFIN Council for decisions that were prepared in the Eurogroup would infringe the 
Treaties. Primary law provides for a right of non-Eurozone Member States to also present 
their views on Eurozone matters in the Council and, by that, to control the Eurozone Member 
States, which have the exclusive voting rights in Eurozone matters. 
 
The Treaty considers the Council as the core decision-making institution in the economic 
governance of the Union. The Council covers all 28 EU Member States. The Treaty only re-
stricts the voting rights to the Eurozone Member States. The non-Eurozone Member States 
are not excluded from taking part in the Council meetings on Eurozone affairs and from 
raising their voices therein. By both elements the Treaties make clear that the control of 
Eurozone activities is a task of the Union as a whole. Against this background, a genuine 
democratic accountability of whatsoever kind of ‘European Economic Government’ for the 
Eurozone requires a democratic control by a Parliamentary body of the entire Union, which 
is the European Parliament. The possibilities of adapting Union law to the strengthened de 
facto role of the Eurogroup are further explored in the chapter on enhancing democratic 
legitimacy of the Eurozone under 4.2. 
1.2. Monetary Union  
1.2.1. Changes in the Lisbon Treaty 
Chapter 2 on the Monetary Policy is largely the same under the Lisbon Treaty as under the 
previous Treaty with two exceptions: First, the special legislative procedure in Article 
123(4)(3) of the previous TEC was replaced by the ordinary legislative procedure in Article 
133 TFEU. Second, the requirement to receive the assent of the European Parliament under 
Article 105(6) of the previous TEC was replaced by a simple obligation to consult the Euro-
pean Parliament when conferring specific tasks upon the ECB concerning policies relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions under Article 
127(6) TFEU. It is worth mentioning that the latter was the only downgrade of Parliamentary 
rights in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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1.2.2. The role of the ECB 
The role of the ECB is, under the Lisbon Treaty, the same as under the previous Treaty. The 
ECB conducts the monetary policy of the Union in accordance with Article 127(1) TFEU. It 
shall maintain price stability as its primary objective. To the extent that the objective of price 
stability is not undermined, the ECB shall also support the general economic policies in the 
Union as its secondary objective. When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and 
duties conferred upon the ECB by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, 
it enjoys under Article 130 TFEU an independence guarantee, which shields it from political 
influence on its decision-making. 
 
On the basis of Article 127(6) TFEU, the Union legislator entrusted the ECB with specific task 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions by adopting Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2013. Since these tasks were conferred upon the ECB by secondary law and 
not by the Treaties or the ESCB/ECB-Statute, its activities are not covered by the independ-
ence guarantee in Article 130 TFEU. The role of the ECB in banking supervision is ambiguous, 
since banking supervision is a task, which affects the entire internal market but the ECB is 
only responsible for Euro area Member States, and since Article 127(6) TFEU only allows the 
conferral of ‘certain tasks’ in relation to banking supervision but not the whole task. By that, 
the ECB is the head of a network of national authorities of Member States that fall under the 
regulation because their currency is the euro and of Member States that opted into the ‘single 
supervisory mechanism’ (SSM) voluntarily.  
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2. SUBJECTS OF IMPROVEMENT WITHIN THE TREATY 
BOUNDARIES 
2.1. Strengthening compliance 
It was explained under 1.1.3 that the current legal framework of the economic policy coor-
dination lacks of efficient means to ensure compliance. Before one can turn to concrete pro-
posals on how to strengthen compliance, one has to take a closer look at the reasons why a 
Member State is non-compliant (2.1.1). Based on an analysis and a critical assessment of 
the existing mechanisms addressing non-compliance, one may further examine whether the 
current Treaty rules allow for the creation of new mechanisms to address non-compliance, 
which are not yet foreseen by the existing Treaty framework (2.1.2).  
2.1.1. Analysis and assessment of the existing mechanisms addressing non-compliance4 
2.1.1.1. Analytical framework  
Compliance can be defined as ‘the state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behav-
iour and a specified rule’ (Raustalia and Slaughter 2002: 539). If there is non-compliance, 
there is hence non-conformity or a difference between an actor’s behaviour and a specific 
rule. Efficient means to remedy non-compliance therefore have to look at an actor’s behav-
iour and have to take into account the reasons for its behaviour in order to be effective. This 
perspective on non-compliance is in particular made by the international relations literature 
(Börzel et al. 2003). According to Börzel et al., one has to distinguish two subgroups of 
reasons for non-compliance: Voluntary non-compliance and involuntary non-compliance 
(Börzel et al. 2003: 19). Voluntary non-compliance is the result of a cost-benefit analysis in 
which, from the perspective of the non-compliant state, the benefits of non-compliance sur-
mount its costs. In return, involuntary non-compliance is independent of any political will of 
the non-compliant state but due to its incapacity to comply. 
 
Based on this classification of state behaviour Börzel et al. identify the following four catego-
ries of means to address non-compliance: 
 
 compliance through enforcement: increasing the costs of non-compliance through 
monitoring of the behaviour and sanctioning of voluntary non-compliance by a state; 
 compliance through persuasion: instead of sanctioning, this approach aims at ‘in-
creasing acceptance of the norm in question as a standard of appropriate behaviour’ and 
at ‘changing actor’s preferences’ in order to prevent/counter voluntary non-compliance; 
 compliance through management: aiming at capacity-building of the state in order to 
address involuntary non-compliance; 
 compliance through internalization: this approach seeks to address non-compliance 
through the ‘internalization of international norms and rules into the domestic political 
and legal system’. Such internalization can be achieved by social, political, economic and 
legal internalization (Koh 1997, Amtenbrink and Repasi 2016). All processes aiming at 
internalization have in common to influence state behaviour from the inside, either 
through public legitimacy of an international norm, which leads to ‘widespread general 
obedience to it’ (social internalization), through political processes that make political 
elites to accept an international norm and include it in national government policy (polit-
                                           
4 The following analysis follows Amtenbrink and Repasi 2016. 
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ical internalization), through transposition into national law, adjudication and dispute set-
tlement (legal internalization) or through market actions push a government to accept 
and to apply the international rule as a standard for government policy (economic inter-
nalization). 
 
Putting these categories in a table, which distinguishes between the two different kinds of 
state behaviour, one gets the following overview: 
 
Table 1. Categories of mechanisms according to how to achieve compliance. 
 
If one wants to apply these categories to the economic governance framework, as it is es-
tablished in the Treaty chapter on EMU, one has to include further distinctions. The economic 
governance framework distinguishes between several economic policy indicators, which are 
to be respected in order to assume that a Member States conduct reasonable economic and 
fiscal policies, and, within the rules relating to these indicators, the economic governance 
framework further distinguishes between mechanisms aiming at preventing an excess of 
those indicators, on the one hand, and mechanisms aiming at remedying an established 
excess of those indicators, on the other.  
 
The aforementioned economic policy indicators are the following: 
 
 Economic policy goals set by the ‘broad guidelines’ (Article 120 TFEU) 
 Macroeconomic indicators (Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011) 
 Medium-term objective for Member States’ budgetary position (MTO) and the adjustment 
path towards it (Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011) 
 Government deficit of 3.0% of GDP and government debt of 60% of GDP (Article 126(2) 
TFEU in conjunction with Protocol (No 12)) 
 Serious difficulties with respect to the financial stability (Regulation (EU) No 472/2013) 
 
Putting the existing compliance mechanisms in a table, which shows the several economic 
indicators in the columns and the distinction between ‘ex ante’- and ‘ex post’-mechanisms in 
the rows, one gets the following overview over the existing compliance mechanisms: 
 
  
Voluntary non-compliance 
(lack of political will)  
Involuntary non-compliance 
(lack of capacity) 
Compliance though persuasion Compliance through management 
Compliance through enforcement  
Compliance through internalization 
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Table 2. Compliance mechanisms in the existing economic policy coordination 
framework 
 
Market-induced enforcement is the overarching compliance mechanism within the Economic 
Union. The development of interest rates on government bonds is supposed to push Member 
States to modify their sovereign economic, fiscal and budgetary policies. In theoretical terms, 
this mechanism is understood as ‘compliance through (economic) internalization’. Its success 
was already assessed under section 1.1.3. 
2.1.1.2. Assessment of the sufficiency of the existing compliance mechanisms in EMU 
In order to assess whether the existing framework lacks of some compliance mechanisms, 
one has to assign, in a second step, the existing compliance mechanisms to the abovemen-
tioned four categories of means to address non-compliance and one has to identify whether 
after the assignment there are gaps in the table.  
 
                                           
5 National Reform Programmes 
6 Art. 3 of Regulation (EU) No (EU) No 1176/2011 based on to the scoreboard (Art. 4) (eventually) followed by an 
in-depth review ‘for each Member State that it [the Commission] considers may be affected by, or may be at risk of 
being affected by, imbalances’ (Art. 5). 
7 Stability or Convergence Programmes 
8 Articles 7 to 12 of Regulation (EU) No (EU) No 1176/2011: (1) Council recommendation setting out a set of policy 
recommendations for the Member State concerned; (2) Submission of a corrective action plan by the Member State 
concerned; (3) Monitoring of the implementation of the corrective action plan by the Commission. 
9 Interest-bearing deposits and, in case of recurring EIPs, an annual fine (Art. 3 of Regulation (EU) No (EU) No 
1174/2011) 
10 Interest-bearing deposits (Art. 4 of Regulation (EU) No (EU) No 1173/2011. 
11 Intergovernmental Treaties amongst EU Member States under International law and outside the EU Treaties. 
 
Broad 
guidelines on 
economic 
policies 
Macro-
economic 
indicators 
MTO and 
adjustment 
path 
Government 
deficit  
Serious 
difficulties 
with respect 
to financial 
stability European semester 
ex ante NRP
5  
Art. 121(3) TFEU 
Alert mechanism6 SCP7 
Art. 121(3) TFEU 
European 
semester 
European 
semester + 
EDP 
ex post Art. 121(4) TFEU Excessive 
Imbalances 
Procedure (EIP)8 
Art. 121(4) TFEU Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) 
Enhanced 
surveillance 
Financial 
sanctions for 
Euro-MS9 
Financial 
sanctions for 
Euro-MS10 
Financial 
sanctions for 
Euro-MS 
IGT11   TSCG: Automatic 
correction 
mechanism in 
national law 
TSCG: Automatic 
correction 
mechanism in 
national law 
Financial 
assistance 
under the ESM-
Treaty 
Economic 
internali-
zation 
Articles 123 to 125 TFEU: Market-induced enforcement of EU rules following the idea that 
interest rates on government bonds reflect the degree of sustainability of a Member State’s 
economic, fiscal and budgetary policies. This requires putting a Member State on the financial 
markets into the same position as any other private debtor, which is ensured by Articles 123 to 
125 TFEU. 
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The ‘ex ante’-mechanisms within the European semester aim at ‘compliance through persua-
sion’. By submitting national policy reports to the Commission, by comparing those reports 
with each other and by discussing the outcomes of these reports in the Council, the European 
semester process aims at persuading Member States to conduct certain economic, fiscal and 
budgetary policies. None of these mechanisms provide for means for capacity-building so 
that they cannot be considered as ‘compliance through management’.  
 
The ‘ex post’-mechanisms are all built on monitoring Member States’ actions and, in case of 
persistent non-compliance, on imposing financial sanctions. Hence, the existing ‘ex post’-
mechanisms can therefore all be assigned to ‘compliance through enforcement’. None of 
these mechanisms provide for means for capacity-building so that they cannot be considered 
as ‘compliance through management’. The only exception is the possibility to receive tech-
nical assistance from the Commission under Article 7(8) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 if a 
Member State is subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme in case of serious dif-
ficulties with respect to its financial stability. This technical assistance can be understood as 
achieving ‘compliance through management’.  
 
If one looks outside of the EU law framework, there are mechanisms aiming at achieving 
‘compliance through management’ in the ESM-Treaty. Before serious difficulties with respect 
to the financial stability of a Member State occur, this Member State may ask for ‘precau-
tionary financial assistance’ under Article 14 of the ESM-Treaty. This assistance ‘aims at help-
ing ESM Members whose economic conditions are still sound to maintain continuous access 
to market financing by reinforcing the credibility of their macroeconomic performance while 
ensuring an adequate safety-net.’12 Once serious difficulties with respect to the financial sta-
bility of a Member State are established, the ESM may grant financial assistance subject to 
the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which links the payment of finan-
cial assistance to the implementation of concrete policy measures. Both mechanisms aim at 
capacity-building (and avoiding the deconstruction of existing capacity) and can, by that, be 
considered as mechanisms aiming at ‘compliance through management’. 
 
Finally, the ‘automatic correction mechanisms’ foreseen by Article 3(1)(e) TSCG, according 
to which a significant observed deviation from the redefined MTO under the TSCG (Article 
3(1)(a) TSCG) or the adjustment path towards it triggers automatically a mechanism aiming 
at correcting the deviation over a defined period of time, can be classified as achieving ‘com-
pliance through internalization’. This correction mechanism has, namely, to be implemented 
in national law ‘through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably con-
stitutional’. By that, compliance is to be achieved through ‘internalization of international 
norms and rules into the domestic legal system’. Its enforcement is to be ensured by national 
courts. 
 
If one now replaces in table 2 the concrete mechanisms by the categories of mechanisms, 
the table will look as follows: 
  
                                           
12 Art. 1 of the ESM Guideline on Precautionary Financial Assistance (http://esm.europa.eu/pdf/ESM Guideline on 
precautionary financial assistance.pdf). 
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Table 3. Replacing the existing compliance mechanisms by categories of 
mechanisms according to how to achieve compliance (table 1). 
 
As a last step, one may now assign the concrete mechanisms ensuring compliance with cer-
tain indicators set by EU law to the kind of state behaviour that they are addressing. This is 
done via categories ‘compliance through persuasion’, ‘compliance through enforcement’, 
‘compliance through management’ and ‘compliance through internalization’. Table 4 gives 
now an overview of the existing compliance mechanisms in EU law in relation to the state 
behaviour, which leads to non-compliance. The table takes into account that ‘compliance 
through persuasion’ aims at preventing non-compliance ex ante and that ‘compliance through 
enforcement’ aims at remedying established non-compliance ex post. 
 
Table 4. Existing compliance mechanisms in relation to state behaviour. 
1Market-induced enforcement (economic internalization): Articles 123-125 TFEU 
 
Broad 
guidelines on 
economic 
policies 
Macro-
economic 
indicators 
MTO and 
adjustment 
path 
Government 
deficit  
Serious 
difficulties 
with respect 
to financial 
stability European semester 
ex ante Persuasion Persuasion Persuasion Persuasion Persuasion 
ex post Enforcement Enforcement Enforcement Enforcement Management 
Enforcement Enforcement Enforcement 
IGT    Internalization Internalization Management 
 
Indicator 
Voluntary  
non-compliance 
(lack of political will)  
Involuntary  
non-compliance 
(lack of capacity) 
  Persuasion Enforcement Internalization Management 
ex ante Broad Guidelines   1 (–) 
Macroeconomic   1 (–) 
MTO    (–) 
Government deficit    (–) 
Financial stability   1  
ex post Broad Guidelines   1 (–) 
Macroeconomic   1 (–) 
MTO   1 (–) 
Government deficit   1 (–) 
Financial stability   1  
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A look at this table reveals that the existing reformed system of economic governance in the 
EU aims almost exclusively at voluntary non-compliance, which is based on a lack of political 
will to comply even though the Member State has the capacities to do so. Looking at invol-
untary non-compliance, where independently of the political will in the non-compliant Mem-
ber State non-compliance can be explained by the lack of capacity to comply, the existing 
economic governance framework provides only for means if there is a serious threat for the 
financial stability of the Member State. At all stages before serious difficulties occur, the 
governance framework does not address involuntary non-compliance by means of manage-
ment. This lack of mechanisms aiming at ‘compliance through management’ could be com-
pensated by effective mechanisms aiming at ‘compliance through internalization’. The insuf-
ficiency of the ‘economic internalization’ by the market-induced enforcement was already 
discussed under section 1.1.3. As regards the ‘legal internalization’ to be achieved with the 
introduction of ‘automatic correction mechanisms’ under Article 3(1)(e) TSCG, reference shall 
be made to the fact that the TSCG was to be implemented into the national law of the con-
tracting states by 1 January 2014 (one year after the entry into force of the TSCG (Art. 3(2))) 
and that for the year 2015, according to the economic forecast of the European Commis-
sion,13 only 4 of the contracting states (Cyprus, Estonia, Germany and Luxemburg) have a 
structural budget balance below -0.5 % of GDP.  
 
Based on this observation, it appears indeed doubtful whether legal internalization in the 
EMU context will work. This becomes clear in cases of involuntary non-compliance. If, for 
economic reasons, a Member State is not capable of complying with the EU rules, this will 
not change merely because these rules have been implemented into national law. As regards 
voluntary non-compliance, an economically capable, but politically unwilling Member State 
will not adopt different corrective actions to remedy a significant deviation from its MTO 
merely because it is required to do so by national law. Lack of political will or the incapacity 
of a Member State to comply constitutes barriers to legal internalization, rather than that the 
latter is capable of overcoming these reasons for non-compliance. In short, the existing eco-
nomic governance framework arguably reveals the limits of ‘legal internalization’ as means 
to address voluntary and involuntary non-compliance. 
2.1.1.3. The call for an incentive-based compliance mechanism 
All things considered, one identifies the blind spot of the existing governance framework. It 
is built on the belief that non-compliance is the result of a lack of political will within the non-
compliant Member State. It does not take into account the necessity of external support in 
building up capacities to ensure compliance. Only the recent economic and financial crisis 
revealed the necessity for external assistance and led to the establishment of the ESM and 
the possibility to request technical assistance from the Commission in case serious difficulties 
with respect to the financial stability of the Member State occur. Yet, the necessity for exter-
nal assistance already occurs before there are these serious difficulties. 
 
This refers to the idea of an incentive-based compliance mechanism and to the idea of a fiscal 
capacity for the Euro area that was first proposed by the former president of the European 
Council, Herman van Rompuy, on 26 June 2012 (van Rompuy 2012: 6). 
                                           
13 European Commission, European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2015, p. 174. 
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2.1.2. Possible legal bases 
Possible legal bases for the establishment of such a ‘financial support mechanism’ are either 
Article 121(6) TFEU (if only with regard to Member States whose currency is the euro in 
conjunction with Article 136 TFEU) or Article 352 TFEU.  
2.1.2.1. An incentive-based compliance mechanism for the multilateral surveillance 
procedure 
Article 121(6) TFEU can only serve as a legal base for a mechanism that reinforces the mul-
tilateral surveillance procedure. An incentive-based enforcement of recommendations issued 
under Article 121 TFEU is covered by it, although such an enforcement measure is not men-
tioned by this Article. The only explicit enforcement measure in Article 121(4) TFEU is a 
warning addressed to a Member State that can be made public. This means that Member 
States are, in principle, protected against any other sanctions under Article 121 TFEU than 
such a warning. An incentive-based mechanism, however, cannot be seen as a ‘sanction’. A 
regulation based on Article 121(6) TFEU may provide for financial incentives for the adjust-
ment of a Member State’s economic and fiscal policies to policy goals set by Union guidelines 
or by recommendations adopted under Article 121(4) TFEU. Such a regulation would not 
infringe Primary law. In contrast to sanctions, refusing payment of financial incentives in case 
of non-compliance does not worsen the position of a Member State. Prior to a possible adop-
tion of a regulation on financial incentives a Member State would have no right to claim 
financial assistance as it has no right to claim it after the adoption of such a regulation in 
case of non-compliance. Therefore, an incentive-based enforcement measure is covered by 
Article 121 TFEU. A legal act could therefore be based on Article 121(6) TFEU.  
 
If this incentive-based mechanism should only be available for Member States whose cur-
rency is the euro, the legal act establishing this mechanism could be based on Articles 136, 
121(6) TFEU.  
2.1.2.2. Incentives beyond multilateral surveillance: Fiscal capacity 
Article 352 TFEU may serve as a legal base as long as the establishment of an incentive-
based enforcement mechanism is necessary in order to attain one of the objectives set out 
in the Treaties and goes beyond what is needed for the enforcement under the multilateral 
surveillance procedure in Article 121 TFEU. Legislating on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU 
could include an agency, which implements the incentive-based enforcement mechanism. 
The functions of such broader mechanism serve to attain a ‘sustainable development of Eu-
rope based on balanced economic growth’ and to safeguard the ‘economic and monetary 
union whose currency is the Euro’; objectives mentioned by Article 3 TEU.  
 
It is worth noting that a fiscal capacity of the EU or of the Eurozone is, as a part of the Union, 
to be financed by the Union budget. If the financial possibilities of the existing Union budget 
are not sufficient for financing a fiscal capacity, additional payments from Member States 
have to be established in accordance with EU budget law, which raises with regard to a 
Eurozone fiscal capacity the question of a Euro area budget, which is to be addressed sepa-
rately (cf. section 2.2).  
 
Both legal bases, Article 121(6) TFEU and Article 352 TFEU, can be used under enhanced 
cooperation, as both are ‘non-exclusive competences’ in terms of Article 20 TEU. This follows 
from the fact that Article 3 TFEU enumerates all the exclusive competences of the EU in an 
exhaustive manner. Neither Article 121(6) TFEU nor Article 352 TFEU are mentioned by Ar-
ticle 3 TFEU wherefore they are non-exclusive competences. With regard to Article 121(6) 
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TFEU this finding is also supported by Article 136 TFEU as the Member States whose currency 
is the euro can be considered as a special form of an enhanced cooperation of a subgroup of 
Member States. 
 
Besides an action based on Article 352 TFEU, participating Member States could also establish 
an incentive-based enforcement mechanism based on an international Treaty. The principle 
of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU requires, however, that Member States shall give 
a legal action under the Treaties and by using enhanced cooperation priority over the con-
clusion of an international Treaty outside of the EU framework. 
2.1.3. Financing an incentive-based enforcement mechanism or a fiscal capacity through 
borrowing-and-lending operations entered into by the Union 
In addition to the legal base, one may raise the question if a fund that will be installed in 
order to finance an incentive-based enforcement mechanism or a fiscal capacity may carry 
out borrowing-and-lending operations. According to Article 17(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 
No 966/2012 on the financial rules state that ‘the Union and [Union agencies], may not raise 
loans within the framework of the budget.’ At the same time, the Union already raised such 
loans with regard to balancing of payment difficulties caused by the increase in prices of 
petroleum products (cf. Regulation (EEC) No 397/75), to assisting non-Eurozone Member 
States which are experiencing or are seriously threatened with difficulties in their balance of 
current payments (cf. Regulation (EC) No 332/2002) or to financing investment projects 
which contribute to greater convergence and integration of the economic policies of the Mem-
ber States (cf. Council Decision 78/870/EEC). Revenue of these loans is, moreover, consid-
ered to be other revenue of the EU budget in terms of Article 311 TFEU.  
 
The contradiction between the prohibition of raising loans, on the one hand, and the somehow 
different practice, on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that for predefined and 
specific purposes the Union is allowed to enter into borrowing-and-lending operations. The 
Union may, however, not do so in order to finance the general EU budget. The integration of 
a fund financing the incentive-based enforcement mechanism or a fiscal capacity into the 
general EU budget would not prevent to provide for an ability to borrow for it. This ability 
must be restricted to a specific purpose and the guarantees for its borrowing-and-lending 
operations must be mentioned in the general EU budget. Borrowing-and-lending operations 
as such are not part of the general budget. 
2.2. Euro area budget 
A Euro area budget can only be created within the existing EU Treaties if a differentiation can 
be made within EU budget law with regard to revenue and with regard to expenditure. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty refers in Article 310 TFEU in this respect to the general principle of unity 
of the EU budget and its completeness. This means that all revenues and expenditures of the 
Union are part of one EU budget, which is complete and includes therefore every predictable 
revenue and expenditure of the Union. This appears, at first sight, to stand against an own 
budget for the Euro area within the general Union budget. 
 
At second sight, one has to go into further detail in order to examine the possibility to create 
a Euro area budget within the existing Treaty boundaries. In order to do so, one has to, first 
look at revenue side and reply to the question whether a differentiation with regard to reve-
nue is legally possible (2.2.2) and what this would mean for the multiannual financial frame-
work (2.2.3). Before, however, examining the possibilities of differentiation, the important 
distinction between ‘own resources’ and ‘other revenue’ has to be looked at (2.2.1) since the 
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ways of how the one or the other could be increased by means of differentiated integration 
differ. Finally, the question is to be addressed whether a differentiation with regard to ex-
penditure is legally possible (2.2.4). 
2.2.1. Distinction between ‘own resource’ or ‘other revenue’ 
Article 311(2) TFEU distinguishes with regard to the revenue of the Union between ‘own 
resources’ and ‘other revenue’. This distinction is of importance for the required procedures 
establishing or amending the respective type of revenue. If contributions to the general 
budget of the Union are to be classified as an ‘own resource’, they have to be included into 
the Own Resources Decision under the legislative procedure foreseen by Article 311(3) TFEU: 
The Council adopts unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament the decision 
which has to be approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective consti-
tutional requirements.  
 
If contributions to the general budget of the Union are to be classified as ‘other revenue’, 
they can be established in a Union legal act outside of the Own Resources Decision. In this 
case, one has to find the correct legal base for this legal act. On the one hand, in principle, 
financial contributions paid by EU Member States, which are additional to the contributions 
paid by Member States under the Own Resources Decision (GNI contributions), cannot be 
created by another majority than the one foreseen by Article 311(3) TFEU. Additional contri-
butions created on the basis of another majority (as foreseen, for example, by Article 352 
TFEU which does not refer to an approval by Member States in accordance with their respec-
tive constitutional requirements) appear therefore to undermine the own resources legislative 
procedure. On the other hand, with regard to Union agencies, the EU legislator already cre-
ated additional financial contributions by Member States in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure. Article 62(1)(a) of the regulation on the European Banking Authority 
(Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010) provides for ‘obligatory contributions from the national pub-
lic authorities’ to the budget of EBA. The legal base for the EBA regulation is Article 114 TFEU. 
This suggests that the creation of additional financial contributions of EU Member States does 
not require the same majority as the one foreseen by Article 311(3) TFEU and not even the 
consent of every EU Member State. 
 
There are, however, good reasons to come to the conclusion that with regard to additional 
contributions of Member States to the general EU budget, at least unanimity is required and, 
by that, only Article 352 TFEU would be the right legal base. Contributions paid by competent 
national authorities to the budget of a Union authority that is separated from the EU budget 
(like the EBA budget) cannot be compared to contributions paid by Member States to the 
general EU budget. Allowing to create additional financial contributions without the possibility 
for a single Member State to raise its veto against a financial obligation would undermine the 
clear Treaty statement in Article 311(3) TFEU according to which no additional financial bur-
den for the Member States’ budget can be created by the European Union without the ap-
proval of all Member States. The application of a qualified majority voting as it is foreseen by 
other legal bases is, furthermore, highly questionable with regard to Member States budget-
ary sovereignty. Therefore, if the contributions are to be classified as ‘other revenue’, they 
can be included into a legal act based on Article 352(1) TFEU.   
 
Whether the contributions to a fund financing an incentive-based enforcement mechanism or 
a fiscal capacity are to be classified as ‘own resource’ or ‘other revenue’ is very much linked 
to the legal design of the contributions. If the fund for an incentive-based enforcement mech-
anism or a fiscal capacity is exclusively financed by the general Union budget, additional 
financial contributions raised from Member State to finance the increased refinancing needs 
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of the general Union budget are ‘own resources’. If the financial contributions are earmarked 
in such a way that the revenue generated by these contributions can only be used in order 
to finance expenditure of the incentive-based enforcement mechanism or fiscal capacity, they 
can be considered ‘other revenue’. This follows from the distinction in Article 311(2) TFEU, 
according to which the general budget is wholly financed by own resources, whilst ‘other 
revenue’ may not replace revenue generated by ‘own resources’ in their capacity to balance 
the general Union budget. 
 
This distinction is reflected by Article 21 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 on the 
financial rules that introduces the category of ‘assigned revenue’, which, according to Recital 
No 8 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 laying down the multiannual financial 
framework for the years 2014-2020, is not to be taken into account by the ceilings set by 
the multiannual financial framework. Assigned revenue is revenue that cannot be used by 
the general Union budget for the purposes defined by the Union legislator irrespective of the 
will of the contributors, but only and exclusively for the purposes as agreed by the contribu-
tors. Assigned revenue links the amount of the contributions to the expenditure it is assigned 
to. The amount of the assigned revenue equals the amount of the budget item that it fi-
nances. From the perspective of the general Union budget, assigned revenue and budget 
items financed by this assigned revenue are neutral.  
 
If the Union legislator raised earmarked financial contributions from Member States in order 
to finance a fund for an incentive-based enforcement mechanism or the a fiscal capacity, the 
aforementioned clarifies that this can only be done on the basis of a legal base that provides 
for a unanimous voting in the Council. Only the possibility for a contributor to raise its veto 
allows for the conclusion that the contributors agreed on the use of the financial contributions. 
Based on these considerations, additional financial contributions that are earmarked for an 
exclusive use by an incentive-based enforcement mechanism or a fiscal capacity could be 
raised as ‘other revenue’ on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU.  
2.2.2. Differentiation with regard to revenue 
EU budget law allows for differentiation with regard to revenue. This can be seen by Article 
332 TFEU. According to this article, expenditure other than administrative costs entailed for 
the Union institutions shall be borne, in principle, by the participating Member States. The 
wording of this provision appears to allow a subset of Member States to establish a fund and 
even to require putting this fund outside of the general EU budget. The main idea of Article 
332 TFEU, however, is rather that non-participating Member States should not bear costs of 
decisions on which they have no political influence. It is therefore not clear under Article 332 
TFEU whether expenditure resulting from implementation of enhanced cooperation has to be 
borne outside of or within the EU budget. Article 326 TFEU states in this respect that any 
enhanced cooperation shall comply with the Treaties and Union law and, by that, does not 
allow any deviation from general EU law and principles of EU budget law. Hence, Article 332 
TFEU is based on the assumption that differentiated revenue is allowed under EU budget law. 
 
There is one example where a group of Member States finances a specific European project. 
It is the case of the ‘High Flux reactor’ which is financed by Belgium, France and the Nether-
lands (Council Decision 2012/709/Euratom on the adoption of the 2012-2015 High Flux Re-
actor supplementary re-search programme to be implemented by the Joint Research Centre 
for the European Atomic Energy Community ([2012] OJ L 321/59)). This decision was 
adopted on the basis of Article 7 Euratom Treaty. The contributions paid by Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands are financial contributions made to the general EU budget by way of 
assigned revenue. These contributions are classified as ‘other revenue’ in terms of Article 
Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – Improving functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
29 
 
311 TFEU. A similar provision can be found in Article 184 TFEU on supplementary pro-
grammes for research and technological development. Article 184 TFEU was, however, not 
used until now. 
2.2.3. Differentiated revenue and the Multiannual Financial Framework 
According to Article 312(1) TFEU, the annual budget of the Union shall comply with the Mul-
tiannual Financial Framework (MFF). According to recital No. 8 of the Council Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) No 1311/2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-
2020 the ‘MFF should not take account of budget items financed by assigned revenue within 
the meaning’ of the Financial Regulation. This refers to specific items of expenditure for which 
a Union act explicitly defines the revenue that has to be used in order to finance this ex-
penditure. In short, every revenue, which is earmarked by a Union legal act and explicitly 
assigned to certain expenditure, is not covered by the MFF ceilings. Such revenue has not, 
by definition, to be financed by all EU Member States.  
2.2.4. Differentiation with regard to expenditure 
As with regard to revenue, differentiation is also with regard to expenditure legally possible 
under the existing EU budget law. As explained above, Article 332 TFEU is based on the 
assumption that expenditure resulting from the implementation of an enhanced cooperation 
is borne by the general Union budget and does not set up a legal obligation for participating 
Member States to establish a separate budget for purpose of the enhanced cooperation. By 
that, Article 332 TFEU reflects the legal situation under EU budget law, which allows for 
differentiated expenditure.  
 
A precedent for such a differentiation can be found in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro area. Ac-
cording to this article, ‘the interest earned by the Commission shall constitute other revenue 
as referred to in Article 311 TFEU and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability 
Facility.’ This regulation defines payment obligations only for Euro area Member States and 
the EFSF to which the revenue is allocated is a body exclusively composed by Euro area 
Member States and which only provides for financial assistance for Euro area Member States. 
2.2.5. Conclusion 
In sum, the current Treaty framework allows the establishment of a Euro area budget outside 
of the ceilings of the MFF as long as financial contributions from Eurozone Member States are 
explicitly assigned to certain expenditure items for the benefit of Eurozone Member States. 
Depending on the overall amount of those financial contributions compared to the total 
amount of the general Union budget, those additional financial contributions would be new 
own resources wherefore the Own Resources Decision would have to be amended in accord-
ance with the procedure foreseen by Article 311 TFEU.  
2.3. Convergence Code 
The European Parliament raised in its resolution of 12 December 2013 on constitutional prob-
lems of a multitier governance in the European Union (P7_TA(2013)0598) the idea of adopt-
ing a ‘convergence code’, which should cover today’s ‘Euro Plus Pact, the Europe 2020 strat-
egy and the Compact for Growth and Jobs’. This convergence code should be ‘adopted under 
the ordinary legislative procedure’ (second contribution from the Sherpas to the Five Presi-
dents’ Report, p. 2). The exact content of the convergence code is unclear. There are several 
options how such a convergence code can be designed.  
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The European Parliament made reference to ‘soft law’ instruments, which are legally not 
binding. This reference can be understood in a way that the ‘convergence code’ only bundles 
the existing soft law-instruments into one soft law-instrument. Such a merger of different 
soft law instruments appears legally unproblematic. If, however, this merger is combined 
with an ‘upgrade’ of these soft law-instruments to an act of legally binding nature, such an 
‘upgrade’ would require a Treaty change. Article 121(2) TFEU only allows the adoption of a 
recommendation if the EU wants to set policy goals for Member States’ economic policies. 
Recommendations are, according to Article 288(4) TFEU legally non-binding. The adoption of 
an act, which is legally binding, instead of a recommendation based on Article 121(2) TFEU 
would therefore violate Primary law insofar as there are no other legal bases in the Treaties 
that provide for the adoption of legally binding acts. This is the case with regard to tax law 
(based on Article 113 concerning indirect taxes and of Article 115 TFEU concerning direct 
taxes) or social law (on the basis and within the limits of Article 153 TFEU). Yet, these pro-
visions do not provide for an ordinary legislative procedure but for a special legislative pro-
cedure.  
 
If the ‘convergence code’ remains a soft law-instrument, one may question its added value 
as compared to the existing instruments. The answer to this question depends on the con-
crete design of the code. Such a code could provide for an approximation of Member States’ 
economic and fiscal policies by setting minimum and maximum levels for a set of economic 
indicators. Instead of setting fixed standards or vague policy goals, such a code could set a 
range with respect to certain policy objectives. This allows Member States to still conduct 
differing economic and fiscal policies but within a range that is defined by the code. Whilst 
such a code, from a legal perspective, raises the same questions with regard to its enforce-
ability as the existing soft law-instruments such as the recommendations or the Euro-Plus-
Pact, it may, however, increase the general acceptance of the policy goals set by the EU 
within Member States and increase, by that, compliance (such compliance is in this study 
understood as ‘political internalization’, cf. section 2.1.1.1).  
2.4. Establishment of a Redemption Fund 
In 2012, the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) proposed in its 
annual report the establishment of a European Redemption Fund (ERF). The ERF, as proposed 
by the ‘Sachverständigenrat’ consists of several elements (Sachverständigenrat 2012: 107): 
Government debt, which amounts above the reference value of 60% of GDP, would be trans-
ferred to a common redemption fund subject to joint and several liability. During a ‘roll in’ 
phase of around five years the transferral of government debt is made by a purchase of 
bonds with a maturity of more than two years of participating Member States on the primary 
market (Schorkopf 2012: 9). The debts remain exclusively with the participating countries. 
A consolidation path has to be laid down for each Member State in a legally binding way, 
which would require from the Member State to autonomously redeem the transferred debt 
over a period of 20 to 25 years. 
 
After the ‘roll in’ phase a Member State’s outstanding debt level would comprise (1) debts 
for which it is individually liable amounting to 60% of GDP, and (2) debts that, at the time of 
the transfer, exceed the reference value of 60% of GDP, which are transferred to the ERF. 
The transferring Member States bears the primary liability and the ERF a secondary liability. 
The joint liability during the repayment phase means that bonds would be issued by the ERF 
with a high rating in order to stabilise the European financial system until the national bond 
markets regain sufficient functionality. Participation is subject to strict conditionality. If a 
Member State does not meet its political reform commitments, which are supposed to lead 
to consolidation and growth, the ‘roll in’ would be discontinued and the Member State in 
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question would be fully exposed once again to the international financial market. Finally, in 
order to cover the eventuality that an individual participating Member State is called on to 
pay up under its joint and several liability, its risk would have to be limited by agreeing a 
burden-sharing scheme among the participating Member States. 
 
The report of the Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills considered the es-
tablishment of an ERF not to be possible under the existing Treaties (Expert Group on Debt 
Redemption Fund and Eurobills 2014: 57 et seqq.). This conclusion was based on two argu-
ments. First, the ERF would violate Article 125 TFEU, even read in the light of the ECJ’s 
decision in the ‘Pringle’ case (ECJ 2012b) (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eu-
robills 2014: 58 et seq.). Second, Article 352(1) TFEU would not suffice as a legal base within 
the existing Treaties. A Treaty change is required (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund 
and Eurobills 2014: 64 at para. 250). Both arguments will be critically assessed in the fol-
lowing. 
2.4.1. Violation of Article 125 TFEU 
According to Article 125(1) TFEU, neither the Union nor a Member State is to ‘be liable for 
[…] the commitments’ of another Member State or ‘‘assume [those] commitments’. The 
wording of Article 125(1) TFEU suggests that any legal construction, which leads to an auto-
matic payment of the full amount of financial commitments of one Member State by the other 
Member States or the Union, such as a guarantee structure based on joint and several liabil-
ity, violates per se Article 125(1) TFEU.  
 
Yet, in its ‘Pringle’ judgment, the European Court of Justice specified the content of this 
provision. According to the Court, Article 125 TFEU is not intended to prohibit either the Union 
or the Member States from granting any form of financial assistance whatsoever to another 
Member State. The Court relies on the purpose of Article 125 TFEU, which is to ensure that 
the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt. 
Markets, so the idea, prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with such 
discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely main-
taining the financial stability of the monetary union. The Court therefore concludes that ‘Ar-
ticle 125 TFEU […] prohibits the Union and the Member States from granting financial assis-
tance as a result of which the incentive of the recipient Member State to conduct a sound 
budgetary policy is diminished. However, Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting of 
financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member State which remains re-
sponsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to such 
assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy’ 
(ECJ 2012B: para 136 et seq.). This leads to the assumption that financial assistance, which 
meets the following two criteria, does not violate Article 125(1) TFEU: Financial assistance 
must be indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a 
whole and subject to strict conditions.  
 
When applying these two conditions to the establishment of a redemption fund, one comes 
to the conclusion that it would not violate Article 125(1) TFEU. The financial and economic 
crisis revealed that overindebted government budgets lead to significant crisis of the financial 
stability within a monetary union. Reducing debt to the level that can be tolerated under 
Maastricht criteria is therefore indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of 
the euro area. Furthermore, participation in the redemption fund is, as shown above, subject 
to strict conditionality. 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32 
 
This strict application of the two conditions ignores, however, the purpose of Article 125(1) 
TFEU. If one reduces the legality test under Article 125(1) TFEU of financial assistance pro-
grammes to the fulfilment of these two criteria, any financial assistance programme could 
pass it. The purpose of Article 125(1) TFEU, which is to remain subject to the logic of the 
market which coordinates Member States’ economic, fiscal and budgetary policies, would be 
completely ignored (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills 2014: 60). There-
fore, the ECJ also required in the ‘Pringle’ judgment that the Member State, which receives 
financial assistance, ‘will remain responsible to its creditors for its financial commitments’ 
(ECJ 2012b: para. 138). It appears now that the legality test for a redemption fund fails to 
meet this understanding of the purpose of Article 125(1) TFEU, since government debt of 
more than 60% of the GDP of the participating Member State is taken over by the ERF, which 
is backed by a joint and several guarantee by the participating Member States. This was the 
main argument, on which the Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills based 
its assumption that Article 125(1) TFEU would be violated by the establishment of an ERF. 
 
Against this understanding, one may now refer to the concrete assessment of the ECJ in its 
‘Pringle’ judgment of the several instruments of the ESM. Under Articles 17 and 18 of the 
ESM-Treaty, the ESM may purchase bonds issued by an ESM Member State on the primary 
market. The ECJ compared such purchases to the granting of a loan under Article 15 and 16 
of the ESM-Treaty (ECJ 2012B: para. 140). Granting a loan does, according to the ECJ, not 
imply ‘that the ESM will assume the debts of the recipient Member State. On the contrary, 
such assistance amounts to the creation of a new debt, owed to the ESM by that recipient 
Member State, which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors in respect of 
its existing debts’ (ECJ 2012B: para 139). The Court emphasised that ‘any financial assis-
tance granted on the basis of Articles 14 to 16 thereof must be repaid to the ESM by the 
recipient Member State’ (ECJ 2012B: para 139). Based on these considerations by the Court, 
the purchase of government bonds covering the government debt above 60% of GDP by the 
ERF would not violate Article 125(1) TFEU. The Member State in question remains responsible 
for its commitments, only now not any more vis-à-vis a private financial market operator but 
vis-à-vis the ERF. 
 
This leads to the final question whether the joint and several liability of the participating 
Member States for the ERF is to be considered a violation of Article 125(1) TFEU. The wording 
of Article 125(1) TFEU refers to ‘the commitments of central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any 
Member State’ when defining, which commitments are covered by it. The wording does not 
refer to commitments of the EU or other international entities. Commitments of a European 
redemption fund therefore seem not to be covered by Article 125(1) TFEU and, thus, a joint 
and several liability of Member States participating in the ERF is not violating Article 125(1) 
TFEU (Nettesheim 2012: 607). Yet, one may argue, as the Expert Group on Debt Redemption 
Fund and Eurobills did, that such an understanding of Article 125(1) TFEU would undermine 
its effectiveness as Member States could escape their obligations under this article by simply 
establishing an international fund (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills 
2014: 59). Even if Article 125(1) TFEU could be applied to commitments of the ERF, a joint 
and several liability would not conflict with it.  
 
In the ‘Pringle’ judgement, the ECJ examined the legality of Article 25(2) ESM-Treaty, which 
dealt with a situation in which an ESM member fails to meet the required payment under a 
capital call under the ESM-Treaty. In such a situation, under Article 25(2) ESM-Treaty, ‘a 
revised increased capital call shall be made to all ESM Members with a view to ensuring that 
the ESM receives the total amount of paid-in capital needed.’ This situation can be understood 
as some sort of joint and several liability of the other ESM members in case of an inability to 
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pay by one of the ESM members. The ECJ upheld this provision by referring to the fact that 
‘under that same provision, the defaulting ESM Member State remains bound to pay its part 
of the capital. Accordingly, the other ESM Members do not act as guarantors of the debt of 
the defaulting ESM Member’ (ECJ 2012B: para 145). This means that, as long as every Mem-
ber State that participates in the ERF remains bound to its consolidation path, even in the 
event of a default, a temporary financial assistance of the other Member States participating 
in the ERF to the ERF would be in line with Article 125(1) TFEU. This shows that, according 
to the ECJ, a legally binding internal burden sharing between the participating Member States 
is sufficient in order to consider a liability of participating Member States, which goes beyond 
a predefined share that has to be covered by each Member State, to be a financial commit-
ment, which is not violating Article 125(1) TFEU. 
2.4.2. Legal base 
The second line of arguments against a legally possible establishment of an ERF under the 
existing Treaties relates to legal base (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills 
2014: 63). A possible legal base is Article 352(1) TFEU. According to this article, the Council, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, may adopt measures if Union action should prove necessary to 
attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties provided that there are no specific com-
petences in the Treaties. The objective can be found in Article 3(4) TEU, referring to the 
establishment of an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro, which includes 
the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro area as a necessary condition for the 
functioning of the EMU. This objective is met with regard to the ERF since it guarantees a 
reduction of government debt down to the Maastricht criterion of 60% of GDP and stabilizes, 
by that, Member States’ national budgets. Based on these arguments, the ESM could have 
been established on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU, which was not excluded by the ECJ in 
the ‘Pringle’ judgment (ECJ 2012b: para. 67).14 
 
Yet, a legal act based on Article 352(1) TFEU may not modify the Primary law. Otherwise, it 
would undermine the Treaty change procedure foreseen by Article 48 TEU. Based on this 
observations, one may argue against the possibility to use Article 352(1) TFEU for the estab-
lishment of an ERF that it would undermine Member States’ budgetary sovereignty, as pro-
tected by Article 311 TFEU (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills 2014: 63). 
One may, indeed, establish a principle, according to which Union legal acts may not request 
any payments from Member States’ budgets outside their contributions to the Union budget. 
Whilst this is not completely true, since Article 311(2) allows for ‘other revenue’, which in-
cludes payments from Member States’ budgets without being an own resource, it can be 
validly claimed that the amount covered by the ERF, which is surpassing the totality of the 
amount covered by the Union budget, cannot be considered anymore as ‘other revenue’ in 
terms of Article 311(2) TFEU. It may only be claimed from Member States if established as a 
new ‘own resource’. 
 
It is therefore true to argue that a legal act based om Article 352(1) TFEU may not circumvent 
Article 311(3) TFEU and its reference to an approval of the introduction of a new category of 
own resources by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional re-
                                           
14 It should be noted that the ECJ examined the legality of the ESM before the entry into force of Decision 2011/199, 
which introduced Article 136(3) in the TFEU. Since this did not harm the legality of the ESM (EuGH 2012: para. 
185), neither an international Treaty such as the ESM-Treaty nor a Union act based on Article 352(1) TFEU would 
have been in violation of the Treaties. The reasoning of the ECJ with regard to the ESM-Treaty would have to be 
applied in the same manner to a Union legal act. 
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quirements (Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills 2014: 63). This is, how-
ever, no argument against the establishment of an ERF within the existing Treaties but in 
favour of it. The establishment of an ERF would only require two legal acts: (1) The estab-
lishing legal act on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU and (2) the introduction of a new own 
resource covering the payments to the ERF on the basis of Article 311(3) TFEU.  
2.4.3. Conclusion 
The establishment of a European redemption fund, following the model proposed by the Ger-
man Council of Economic Experts, can legally be done under the existing Treaties. It would 
require two legal act: One establishing the ERF, on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU, and one 
introducing a new category of own resources covering the payments of the participating 
Member States to the ERF, on the basis of Article 311(3) TFEU. A redemption fund is not 
violating Article 125(1) TFEU if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
 
1. Member States remain responsible for their commitments to their creditors: The redemp-
tion fund would purchase during the ‘roll in’ phase bonds issued by the participating Mem-
ber States. This purchase is similar to the purchase of bonds under Article 17 of the ESM-
Treaty. The purchase creates a new debt, owed to the redemption fund by the recipient 
Member State. 
 
2. Participation in the redemption fund is subject to strict conditionality whose purpose is to 
prompt the implementation of a sound budgetary policy of participating Member States. 
 
3. There has to be a legally binding burden sharing between the participating Member 
States, which is not conditional upon the ability of the Member States to pay.  
2.5. Inclusion of the TSCG into the EU legal framework 
The TSCG can in large parts already be included into the existing EU legal framework without 
Treaty change. This follows from the fact the TSCG, being an inter se agreement of a subset 
of Member States under International law, has to be in compliance with existing primary and 
secondary EU law and may not modify it (see in detail on the legal framework for inter se 
agreements section 1.1.4.3). The content of the TSCG is therefore either already covered by 
secondary Union law that was adopted in the meantime or could be included into secondary 
Union law on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU or Article 126(14) TFEU. 
 
The following table shows, which provisions of the TSCG can already be found in the existing 
secondary law, which provisions could be included in future secondary legislation and which 
provisions require a Treaty change in order to be transposed into the EU legal framework. 
 
TSCG Content Existing EU law Inclusion into future EU law 
Art. 3(1)(a) Balanced budget rule Art. 2a(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97 
not needed 
Art. 3(1)(b) Definition of the 
country-specific 
medium-term objective 
for a structural deficit 
not to be more than 
0.5% of GDP 
Art. 2a(2) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97: 
Amendment of Art. 2a(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
Definition of the country-
specific medium-term 
objective not be more than 
1.0% of GDP 
Reduction of the country-specific 
medium-term objective to 0.5% of 
GDP for Member States whose 
government debt is significantly 
below 60% of GDP 
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TSCG Content Existing EU law Inclusion into future EU law 
Art. 3(1)(d) Definition of the 
country-specific 
medium-term objective 
for a structural deficit of 
states with a 
government debt 
significantly below 60% 
of GDP not to be more 
than 1.0% of GDP  
Art. 2a(2) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97: 
Amendment of Art. 2a(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
Definition of the country-
specific medium-term 
objective not be more than 
1.0% of GDP 
Country-specific medium-term 
objective of 1.0 % of GDP is only 
allowed for Member States whose 
government debt is significantly 
below 60% of GDP 
Art. 3(1)(c), 
Art. 3(3) 
Definition of the 
deviation possibility in 
case of exceptional 
circumstances 
Art. 5(1)(10), Art. 6(3)(4), 
Art. 9(1)(10) and Art. 
10(3)(4) of Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/97: 
not needed 
Identical definition of the 
deviation possibility 
Art. 3(3) Definition of ‘annual 
structural balance of the 
general government’ 
Art. 2a(2) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97: 
not needed 
Definition in TSCG refers to 
the definition in Art. 2a(2) 
Art. 3(1)(e) Automatic correction 
mechanism 
Art. 5 of Directive 
2011/85/EU 
Amendment of Art. 5 of Regulation 
(EU) No 473/2013 
Definition of numerical 
fiscal rules 
(1) A medium-term objective and 
the adjustment path towards it are 
considered to be numerical fiscal 
rules. The requirement to enforce 
numerical fiscal rules by means of 
an automatic correction 
mechanism can be included into 
Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013 that deals with the 
enforcement of numerical fiscal 
rules. 
(2) Extension of Regulation (EU) 
No 473/2013 to all Member States 
Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013 
Establishment of 
independent bodies 
monitoring compliance with 
numerical fiscal rules 
Art. 3(2) Implementation 
requirement: Provisions 
of binding force and 
permanent character, 
preferably constitutional 
Art. 5 of Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013 
Amendment of either Art. 5 of 
Directive 2011/85/EU or Art. 5 of 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 
Establishment of 
independent bodies 
monitoring compliance with 
numerical fiscal rules 
(1) The implementation of EU law 
into national law always has to be 
made by provisions of binding 
force and permanent character. 
Only the constitutional level cannot 
be ordered. Art. 3(2) TSCG, 
however, requires only ‘preferably 
constitutional’ without setting up a 
legal obligation to include the 
automatic correction mechanism 
into the constitution. Such rule can 
be included into EU secondary law. 
(2) If amendment of Art. 5 of 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013: 
Extension of this regulation to all 
Member States 
Art. 4 Debt brake rule: 
Reduction of debt at an 
average rate of 1/20 per 
year 
Art. 2(1a) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1467/97 
not needed 
An excess of the reference 
value for government debt 
is considered as sufficiently 
diminishing if the 
differential with respect to 
the reference value has 
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TSCG Content Existing EU law Inclusion into future EU law 
decreased over the previous 
three years at an average 
rate of one twentieth per 
year as a benchmark. 
Art. 5 Budgetary and economic 
partnership programmes 
Art. 9 of Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013 
(1) Content: not needed 
(2) Extension of Regulation (EU) 
No 473/2013 to all Member States 
If the Council decided that 
an excessive deficit exists in 
a Member State, the 
Member State concerned 
shall present an economic 
partnership programme 
describing the policy 
measures and structural 
reforms that are needed to 
ensure an effective and 
lasting correction of the 
excessive deficit. 
Art. 6 Ex-ante reporting 
obligations for Member 
States on public debt 
issuance plans 
Art. 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 
No 473/2013 
(1) Content: not needed 
(2) Extension of Regulation (EU) 
No 473/2013 to all Member States 
Member States shall report 
to the Commission and the 
Eurogroup, ex ante and in a 
timely manner, on their 
national debt issuance 
plans. 
Art. 7 Reversed qualified 
majority voting 
concerning the Council 
decision under Article 
126(6) TFEU 
None Treaty change (Art. 7 modifies, if 
considered to be legally binding, 
the voting modalities in the Council 
as defined by Article 16(3) TEU) 
Art. 8(1) Infringement procedure 
at the ECJ 
None not needed (if TSCG is included 
into the EU legal framework, the 
action for infringement under 
Articles 258 and 259 TFEU can 
applied) 
Art. 8(2) Sanction in case of 
failure to implement the 
automatic correction 
mechanism after a ECJ 
judgment: Penalty 
payments are payable to 
the ESM for Euro area 
Member States and to 
the general budget of 
the Union for non-Euro 
area Member States 
None not needed  (if TSCG is included 
into the EU legal framework, the 
action for infringement under 
Articles 258 and 259 TFEU is to be 
applied with sanction for non-
compliance with ECJ judgments in 
accordance with Article 260 TFEU. 
These sanctions are considered 
‘other revenue’ of the general 
Union budget. A transfer to the 
ESM is excluded but also not 
necessary.) 
Art. 9 Commitment to work 
jointly towards a better 
economic policy through 
enhanced convergence 
and competitiveness 
None (no legal obligation, 
but a political commitment) 
not needed (no legal obligation, 
but a political commitment) 
Art. 10 Declaration to make use 
of Article 136 TFEU and 
of enhanced 
cooperation, whenever 
appropriate and 
necessary 
None (no legal obligation, 
but a political commitment) 
not needed (no legal obligation, 
but a political commitment) 
Art. 11 Commitment to discuss 
major economic policy 
reforms ex-ante 
None (no legal obligation, 
but a political commitment) 
not needed (no legal obligation, 
but a political commitment) 
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TSCG Content Existing EU law Inclusion into future EU law 
Art. 12 Establishment of the 
Euro Summit 
None Treaty change (either to be 
included before Article 137 TFEU 
on the Euro Group or as an own 
Protocol annexed to the Treaties) 
Art. 13 Establishment of an 
interparliamentary 
cooperation at 
committee level 
Art. 9 of Protocol (No 1) on 
the Role of National 
Parliaments in the European 
Union and Rule 142(3) of 
the Rules of Procedure of 
the European Parliament 
not needed (except for 
clarification) 
The European Parliament 
and national Parliaments 
shall together determine 
the interparliamentary 
cooperation. The RoP allows 
EP committees committee 
to directly engage in a 
dialogue with national 
parliaments at committee 
level 
 
In sum, only the reversed qualified majority voting rule has to be included into the EU legal 
framework by a formal Treaty amendment if the voting rule is supposed to be legally binding 
and not to be a mere political declaration of the governments of the EU Member States on 
how to use their voting powers in the Council. Furthermore, the Euro Summit would require 
an own protocol in order to be properly transposed into the existing Treaty framework. Fi-
nally, revenue from the financial sanctions of Euro area Member States for non-compliance 
with an ECJ judgment stating the failure to comply cannot be transferred to the ESM without 
significant legal changes. Penalty payments or lump sums under Article 260 TFEU are as-
signed to the Union budget, but the Union is no contributor to the ESM. Instead of including 
a financial contribution by the EU to the ESM, which equals the amount of penalty payments 
because of the non-compliance of an ECJ judgment stating the failure to implement an au-
tomatic correction mechanism into national law, one should simply delete the rule, according 
to which the penalty payment is to be paid to the ESM. 
 
The other provisions of the TSCG either exist already in the current EU secondary law or 
could be transposed into the EU legal framework on the basis of amendments of existing EU 
secondary legal acts. 
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3. CHANGES TO THE EMU INSTITUTIONAL LAW 
3.1. Role of the European Court of Justice 
The role of the European Court of Justice is, within EMU, in particular within the economic 
coordination framework, a restricted one. This is because of the extensive use of recommen-
dations as non-legally binding measures (Article 288(4) TFEU) in order to set policy goals for 
the Member States, non-compliance with which does not result into a breach of Union law. 
Furthermore, when adopting legally binding decisions within the budgetary surveillance pro-
cedure, according to Article 126(10) TFEU, the action for infringement under Articles 258 and 
259 TFEU is excluded with regard to all decisions (based on Article 126(1) to (9) TFEU) except 
for decisions imposing sanctions. Having said this, it is worth mentioning that the action for 
annulment, the action for failure to act and the preliminary reference procedure are not ex-
cluded. 
 
Any attempt to strengthen the role of the European Court of Justice by either replacing rec-
ommendations by legally binding decisions or by allowing the action for infringement within 
the budgetary surveillance procedure requires a formal Treaty change. This can also not be 
achieved only with respect to a subset of Member States (e.g. such as the Euro area Member 
States) since all means of an enhanced cooperation of a subset of Member States (either 
under Article 20 TEU, Article 136 TFEU or by concluding intergovernmental Treaties) may not 
violate Primary law and, by that, may not modify it. 
 
Besides the limits set by the Treaties to extend the action for infringement under Articles 
258, 259 TFEU to measures adopted under Article 126(1) to (9) TFEU, one may question the 
effectiveness of such an extension. It is true that the budgetary surveillance procedure under 
the existing Article 126 TFEU is a political procedure and not a judicial procedure. Non-com-
pliant Member States are assessed by the Commission but have to justify themselves in front 
of the Council, which can always overrule the Commission. The Commission may then seek 
an annulment of the Council decision under Article 263 TFEU or prosecute the non-compliant 
Member States by initiating the action for infringement. The latter is excluded by Article 
126(10) TFEU. The first will most likely fail because of the broad discretion conferred upon 
the Council. The Commission would therefore have to prove arbitrariness of the Council, 
which will be difficult in practice. 
 
Against this background, a deletion of Article 126(10) TFEU means that the political discretion 
of the Council on establishing the existence of an excessive deficit and on deciding on whether 
necessary steps were taken by the Member State in order to remedy the excessive deficit 
would be replaced by the judicial discretion of the Court. Whether courts, however, are (bet-
ter) equipped for assessing complex economic situations and for taking such decisions if 
requested by the Commission, remains doubtful (Adamski 2012: 1341). The Court itself is 
aware of its lack of expertise wherefore in cases relating to ‘complex assessments’. With 
regard e.g. to the assessments by the European Commission in the area of state aid law, the 
ECJ stated that the ‘review by the European Union judicature of the complex economic as-
sessments made by the Commission is necessarily limited and confined to verifying whether 
the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether 
the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
assessment or misuse of powers’ (ECJ 2010b: para. 66). The Court therefore only examines 
whether the Union institution or agency that has the necessary technical, economic or scien-
tific expertise used its discretionary powers relating to the complex assessments properly 
and did not commit any manifest errors in its assessment or misused its powers. Applying 
this reasoning to matters relating to the budgetary surveillance procedure, the ECJ would not 
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make an own assessment as to whether there is an infringement by the non-compliant Mem-
ber State but follow the Commission’s assessment unless it find manifest errors in the Com-
mission’s assessment of the violation. By that, the deletion of Article 126(10) TFEU will, in 
the end, lead to a situation in which, in principle, the political discretion of the Council is 
replaced by the political discretion of the Commission. 
 
Besides, this argument doubting whether the deletion of Article 126(10) TFEU will effectively 
change the existing political procedure under Article 126 TFEU into a judicial procedure, an-
other issue has to be taken into account. The effect of a judgment of the ECJ in an action for 
infringement is only to establish that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under 
the Treaties. According to Article 260(1) TFEU, ‘the State shall be required to take the nec-
essary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court.’ Continuous non-compliance will 
only entitle the Commission to bring an action for failure to fulfil its obligations requested by 
a Court decision under Article 260(2) TFEU. If now the Court finds that the Member State 
concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment 
on it. By that, the ECJ has, in case of persistent non-compliance, the same means of enforce-
ment as the Council under Article 126(11) TFEU. The issues relating to the lacking means to 
address involuntary non-compliance raised under section 2.1.1.2 will not therefore be ad-
dressed by a deletion of Article 126(11) TFEU. 
 
Hence, the last question to be addressed is whether an extension of the action of infringement 
to Article 126(1) to (9) TFEU could at least solve issues relating to voluntary non-compliance. 
The main difference between the current political procedure and a judicial procedure is the 
addressee of a decision. Whilst a Council decision is addressed to the government of a Mem-
ber State, a judgment of the ECJ is mainly addressed to the national courts. Therefore, an 
extension of the Court’s jurisdiction for actions for infringement to matters relating to budg-
etary surveillance can be understood as establishing a compliance mechanism aiming at ‘legal 
internalization’ in order to overcome the political will of a Member State not to comply by 
making use of national court decisions. Two reservations as to the effectiveness have to be 
made: First, the ‘automatic correction mechanism’ under Article 3(1)(e) TSCG, which has to 
be implemented into national law and which is considered as ‘legal internalization’, has not 
proven to be efficient to achieve compliance with the MTO set by the TSCG. This raises gen-
eral doubts as to ‘legal internalization’ as a means to achieve compliance of politically, un-
willing Member States (cf. section 2.1.1.2). Second, it appears furthermore doubtful whether 
the success of the European Court of Justice in achieving and guaranteeing compliance of 
internal market law (fundamental freedoms and internal market regulations and directives) 
can be repeated with regard to economic policy coordination. The most supportive argument 
for strengthening the role of the European Court of Justice in the economic governance 
framework is the high degree of compliance that can be observed in the context of internal 
market law, which is essentially attributed to the European Court of Justice and the cooper-
ation of the European court with the national courts. The main reason for this success is, 
however, not directly linked to the Court and its case law but to the fact that internal market 
law provides for directly applicable individual rights, which an individual can invoke in front 
of national courts against a non-compliant Member State. In case of violation, under the 
doctrine of the supremacy of EU law, the conflicting national law has to be disapplied by the 
national judge and to be replaced by the EU provision. EU law in the area of economic policy 
coordination and of budgetary surveillance does not contain any individual rights. By that, in 
contrast to internal market law, there are no individuals that could enforce EU norms in front 
of national courts against a non-compliant Member State. Both reservations raise serious 
doubts whether the lack of compliance in affairs relating to the economic policy coordination 
framework can be effectively tackled by strengthening the role of the European Court of 
Justice. 
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3.2. EU Finance Minister 
Recently, the proposal was put forward to install a ‘European Finance Minister’ (Enderlein and 
Haas 2015). The idea behind this proposal is to strengthen the Commission’s role in economic 
governance and to bundle several instruments in one hand. The EU Finance Minister should 
be responsible for the economic policy coordination, the budgetary surveillance and financial 
assistance programmes. In order to do so, the EU Finance Minister should be President of 
the Eurogroup, Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and Vice-President of the 
European Commission and preside the ECOFIN Council. This person should be politically re-
sponsible for the ESM and a future fiscal capacity for the EU. 
 
As a first step, it will be analysed to which extent an EU Finance Minister can be introduced 
on the basis of the existing Treaties (3.2.1). Afterwards the necessity for installing an EU 
Finance Minister will be discussed (3.2.2) before, as a last step, Treaty amendments for the 
establishment of an EU Finance Minister will be proposed (3.2.3). 
3.2.1. EU Finance Minister within the existing Treaty framework 
From a legal perspective, a merger of the position of the Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs with the President of the Eurogroup is possible, taking into account that 
Article 2 of Protocol (No 14) on the Eurogroup does not provide for any specific criteria for 
the selection of the president (this idea is also discussed under section 4.2). A combination 
with the position of the Vice-President would, however, violate the discretionary powers of 
the President of the Commission under Article 17(6)(1)(c) TEU. It is exclusively within the 
powers of the president to appoint the Vice-President. The Treaty only requires that the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has also to be one of the 
Vice-Presidents (Article 17(4) TEU). Conversely, the President of the Commission cannot le-
gally be bound to appoint the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs as one of the 
Vice-Presidents. The same applies with regard to the presidency of the ECOFIN Council. Ar-
ticle 16(9) TEU clearly defines that the ‘Presidency of Council configurations, other than that 
of Foreign Affairs, shall be held by Member State representatives in the Council’. Changing 
the rules of the presidency of Council configurations would therefore require a Treaty change. 
 
More important than the possible mergers of existing positions in the institutional framework 
of economic governance are, however, the competences for the EU Finance Minister. Under 
the current legal framework, the Council has the core role in economic governance. It decides 
on a proposal or a recommendation by the Commission. The Commission may only address 
warnings under Article 121(4) TFEU or opinions under Article 126(5) TFEU. It may also make 
use of its strengthened political influence on the Council decisions or recommendations when 
the reversed qualified majority voting rule is applicable. Shifting the decision-making power 
in economic governance issues from the Council to the Commission would therefore also 
require a Treaty change. 
 
Furthermore, the EU Finance Minister should not only enforce economic policy coordination 
measures, but s/he shall also be responsible for the fiscal capacity and for the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Independently of how both could be implemented into EU law 
(on the fiscal capacity see section 2.1.2, on the inclusion of the ESM-Treaty see section 3.3), 
the financial capacity of both instruments, once they are part of EU law, would equal together 
much more than half of the total EU budget. Such a huge political personal responsibility 
requires a mechanism, based on which the person acting as Finance Minister can be held to 
account in person. Article 234 TFEU, however, makes clear that only the college of Commis-
sioners can be held to account by the European Parliament for the misbehaviour of one or 
more Commissioners. This mechanism is intended to raise the political costs for a motion of 
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censure on the activities of the Commission. The underlying rationale can, however, not an-
ymore be upheld for a Commission, to which a Commissioner belongs who also presides the 
Eurogroup and who is politically responsible for the use of more than half of the EU budget. 
Yet, the current legal framework provides in Article 17(6) TEU for a right of the President of 
the European Commission to request the resignation of a single Commissioner, who then is 
obliged to resign. Point No 5 of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission ([2010] OJ 304, p. 47-62) connects this right of 
the President of the European Commission with a possibility of the European Parliament to 
demand from the President to make use of this right. According to this point, the President 
of the Commission will following such a request from the Parliament ‘seriously consider 
whether to request that Member to resign, in accordance with Article 17(6) TEU. The Presi-
dent shall either require the resignation of that Member or explain his/her refusal to do so 
before Parliament in the following part-session’. By that, this instrument can hardly be un-
derstood as a proper instrument to hold a single Commissioner to account by the European 
Parliament. There is no legal obligation for the President of the Commission to make use of 
this right upon a request of the European Parliament. As long as, at least with regard to the 
EU Finance Minister, the European Parliament cannot legally claim from the President of the 
Commission to request a single Commissioner to resign, the introduction of such a Minister 
is from the perspective of accountability highly questionable. 
3.2.2. Necessity to introduce an EU Finance Minister under the existing legal framework 
From a political perspective, it is hardly recommendable under the existing legal framework 
to introduce an EU Finance Minister. The common understanding of the role of a Finance 
Minister is to raise taxes, to manage the budget and to finance projects of the entity that he 
belongs to. As long as there is no fiscal capacity or European Monetary Fund/European Sta-
bility Mechanism under his/her control, the ‘EU Finance Minister’ will only be the executor of 
austerity measures. This will most likely harm the reputation of the ‘EU Finance Minister’ in 
a way that this position will be no more a credible position in the eyes of non-compliant 
Member States once s/he will be competent to control and to make use of the fiscal capacity 
and/or the European Monetary Fund/European Stability Mechanism. 
3.2.3. Proposed Treaty amendments 
If an EU Finance Minister is to be installed on the occasion of the next Treaty reform, it could 
be modelled after the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs. This 
requires the inclusion of a new article in the TEU establishing this position, which includes 
(1) an appointment procedure, according to the which the EU Finance Minister is proposed 
by the Council in agreement with the President of the European Commission by qualified 
majority and confirmed by the European Parliament, (2) his automatic appointment as one 
of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, (3) his role as president of the ECOFIN Council and 
(4) a mechanism for the European Parliament to table a motion of no-confidence. The articles 
on the European Commission (Article 17 TEU, Articles 246, and 248 TFEU) and on the Council 
(Article 16(9) TEU) have to be adapted accordingly. Furthermore, the Protocol on the Eu-
rogroup should be amended in order to introduce the EU Finance Minister as president of the 
Eurogroup.  
3.3. Inclusion of the ESM into the EU legal framework 
The ESM-Treaty can be included into the existing EU legal framework on the basis of a Union 
legal act based on Article 352(1) TFEU. This follows from the ‘Pringle’ judgement (ECJ 2012b). 
Although the Court left it open in the decision whether the ESM could have been established 
on this legal base (ECJ 2012b: para. 67), it stated clearly that the ESM could be established 
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without violating the EU Treaties before the entry into force of the new Article 136(3) TFEU 
(ECJ 2012b: para. 185). Article 136(3) TFEU, according to which ‘Member States whose cur-
rency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole’, is merely clarifying the law as it stands. 
Against this background, one may only reject Article 352(1) TFEU as an appropriate legal 
base for converting the ESM-Treaty into a Union legal act if the Treaties prevent the Union 
from establishing a stability mechanism, which is allowed for its Member States.  
 
Such an understanding could be derived from Article 122(2) TFEU, which allows the Council 
to grant Union financial assistance to Member States ‘in difficulties or […] seriously threat-
ened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond 
its control’. One may now conclude that the Union is not allowed to grant financial assistance 
outside the scope of Article 122(2) TFEU, which is narrower than the scope of the ESM-Treaty. 
The ESM may grant financial assistance to its Members ‘which are experiencing, or are threat-
ened by, severe financing problems if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and of its Member States’. Since not all ‘severe financing problems’ of 
a Member State can be traced back to ‘severe difficulties caused by […] exceptional occur-
rences beyond [the] control’ of the Member State concerned, the Union may not grant finan-
cial assistance under Article 122(2) TFEU in all situation, which would be covered by the ESM.  
 
The ECJ, however, rejected in its ‘Pringle’ judgment the argument that Article 122(2) TFEU 
is the only legal base, on which the Union may grant financial assistance to Member States 
(ECJ 2012b: para. 131). It concluded with a view to Article 125(1) TFEU that ‘[i]f Article 125 
TFEU prohibited any financial assistance whatever by the Union or the Member States to 
another Member State, Article 122 TFEU would have had to state that it derogated from 
Article 125 TFEU.’ In other words, the Court rejected an understanding of the EU Treaties, 
according to which financial assistance by the Union is forbidden (on the basis of Article 
125(1) TFEU) except for cases, where there is an express Union competence to grant such 
assistance. The Court rather assumes that the Union may grant financial assistance also on 
the basis of other legal bases provided that the financial assistance complies with the condi-
tions set by Article 125(1) TFEU. On the basis of this reasoning, the Union may also grant 
financial assistance to Member States based on Article 352(1) TFU in cases beyond the scope 
of Article 122(2) TFEU as long as they comply with Article 125(1) TFEU. Since, in the eyes of 
the ECJ, the ESM-Treaty is in compliance with Article 125(1) TFEU, the same provisions could 
also be adopted on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU. 
 
Whilst against this background there is a legal basis to include the payment side of the ESM 
into the EU legal framework without a Treaty change, one has to take a closer look at the 
financing side of the ESM after a possible integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework. 
Once the ESM is part of EU law, its expenditure and its revenues is part of the general Union 
budget. This follows from Article 310 TFEU, which embodies the general principle of unity of 
the EU budget and its completeness. This means that all revenues and expenditures of the 
Union are part of one EU budget, which is complete and includes therefore every predictable 
revenue and expenditure of the Union. Since the ESM is an instrument only for the Euro area 
Member States, reference for the main implications of EU budget law on the inclusion of the 
ESM into the EU legal framework shall be made to section 2.2. on the Euro area budget. Very 
briefly, it should be noted at this point that the financial contributions of the ESM Member 
States are earmarked for the exclusive use by the ESM. Such earmarking makes out of these 
financial contributions ‘external assigned revenue’ in terms of Article 21(2)(d) of Regulation 
(EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 on the financial rules. Such ‘external assigned revenue’ is con-
sidered to be ‘other revenue’ in terms of Article 311(2) TFEU so that the Own Resources 
Decision would not have to be modified when including the ESM into the EU legal framework. 
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The ‘external assigned revenue’ is exclusively used for the purpose of financing the ESM but 
not to balance the general Union budget. It is therefore of no relevance for the general Union 
budget. Furthermore, expenditure financed by such ‘external assigned revenue’ is, according 
to Recital No 8 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 laying down the multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2014-2020 (MFF) not to be taken into account by the ceil-
ings set by the multiannual financial framework. This exclusion from the MFF ceilings makes 
sense since expenditure, which is financed by assigned revenue, does not affect the revenue 
arising from ‘own resources’, which finances the general Union budget.  
 
This reasoning shows that the expenditure side and the financing side of the ESM could be 
included into the existing EU legal framework without a Treaty change. The main challenges 
for the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework are the governance side. Currently, 
the ESM Board of Governors is the central decision-making body of the ESM, which not ac-
countable to any other institution. Only each member of the ESM Board of Governors, the 
national finance ministers, is responsible towards their national Parliaments. If included into 
the current EU legal framework, the ESM turns into a Union agency, which is to be controlled 
by the European Commission and the Union legislator. It is, however, doubtful whether the 
governance structure of a Union agency is suitable for the size of the budget and for the 
political impact of the decisions of the ESM on Member States. It appears therefore necessary 
to include the ESM as a proper institution in the EU Treaties, which would allow for tailor-
made governance structures. Such governance structures must take the interest of national 
Parliaments into consideration to have an influence on the decision of how a significant share 
of their national budgets is used. The European Parliament and the Council as budgetary 
authorities of the Union must get supervisory rights over the ESM’s decisions and activists. 
The ECJ should get jurisdiction over the ESM. The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, which 
outlines the policy reforms of a Member State in return for financial assistance from the ESM, 
must be converted into a legal act, which can be reviewed by the European Court of Justice. 
 
These sensitive governance questions require that an inclusion of the ESM should only be 
envisaged when changing the Treaties.  
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4. ENHANCING DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF EMU 
DECISION-MAKING 
4.1. State of accountability in EMU affairs 
4.1.1. Analytical framework for accountability 
Accountability can be described as a mechanism by which those in charge of the exercise of 
public power or public policy making are subject to continuous control and, moreover, can 
be sanctioned in case of bad performance or undesired behaviour (Amtenbrink 2012, 344, 
building on Amtenbrink 1999). Put differently, accountability describes ‘a relationship be-
tween an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his 
or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face 
consequences’ (Bovens 2007, 107). 
 
Based on this definition, the analytical framework regarding the existence and the quality of 
accountability first assesses the foundations of accountability. This refers to transparency 
and access to information, which enable the controlling body to effectively supervise the 
activities of the controlled body. Second, the controlling body must have instruments at hand 
that allow it to assign consequences to a judgment on the activities of the controlled body. 
Such instruments must include means for the controlling body to remedy shortcomings and 
to sanction undesired behaviour (Amtenbrink 2012, 349). Means in this respect can be dis-
missal and reappointment procedures, override mechanisms, budget appropriation and judi-
cial review (following Amtenbrink 1999). 
4.1.2. Application of the analytical framework 
When applying this analytical framework to the accountability of the acting institutions in 
EMU, one comes to the conclusion that accountability is precarious. The acting institutions in 
EMU, the European Council, the ECB, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup, are in 
principle, by being European institutions or de-facto bodies, accountable to the European 
Parliament as the Parliament of the EU. The Treaty provides for an exception with regard to 
the ECB in Article 130 TFEU ‘when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and 
duties conferred upon [the ECB] by the Treaties and the Statute’ (which excludes tasks con-
ferred upon the ECB by secondary law).  
4.1.2.1. Foundations of accountability 
In order to properly exercise the function of political control, as required by Article 14(1) 
TEU, the European Parliament has to have proper access to information as regards Union’s 
action in EMU affairs. According to Article 121(5) TFEU, the President of the Council and the 
Commission shall report to the European Parliament on the results of multilateral surveillance 
and the President of the Council may be invited to appear before the competent committee 
of the European Parliament. This covers the economic policy coordination, the MIP and the 
preventive arm of the SGP. As regards the corrective arm of the SGP, Article 126(11)(3) 
TFEU states that the President of the Council is only under the obligation to inform the Euro-
pean Parliament about the decision imposing sanctions. Furthermore, the European Parlia-
ment may, under Article 226 TFEU, set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate 
alleged contraventions or maladministration of Union institutions or bodies in EMU matters 
in order to gather necessary information. 
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The introduction of the ‘Economic Dialogue’ in the ‘Six Pack’15 and in the ‘Two Pack’16 ex-
tended the obligation to inform and to appear before the competent committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament to all stages of the reformed economic governance and included, ‘where 
appropriate’, the President of the European Council and the President of the Eurogroup. Fur-
thermore, Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 included certain information obligations with regard 
to the enhanced surveillance of Member States facing serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability. Finally, under Article 7(1)(5) and 7(4)(3) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, 
the Commission has to orally inform the chair and the vice-chairs of the competent committee 
about the state of negotiations and drafting of macroeconomic adjustment programmes and 
about the conclusions drawn from the monitoring of the implementation of the macroeco-
nomic adjustment programme. Since MoU under the ESM-Treaty shall, according to Article 
7(2)(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 be ‘fully consistent’ with these macroeconomic ad-
justment programmes, the European Parliament is even recipient of information in ESM af-
fairs. 
 
At first sight, the ‘Economic Dialogue’ appears to provide for sufficient access to information 
for the European Parliament. At second sight, one has to notice that, in principle, only the 
Commission and the President of the Council are legally obliged to inform the European Par-
liament. The President of the European Council and the President of the Eurogroup are only 
under an obligation to appear in front of the competent committee but are not obliged to 
inform the European Parliament about their activities. The only exception can be found with 
regard to the European semester, where, under Article 2-a(4)(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
1466/97, the President of Eurogroup shall report annually to the European Parliament on the 
results of the multilateral surveillance. This lack of continuous information obligations is in 
case of the Eurogroup notably critical, since there is only little transparency as regards the 
discussions and deliberations of the Eurogroup. In principle, there are no minutes of Eu-
rogroup meetings, only brief summaries are sent to the participants of these meetings. Only 
when discussing opinions of the Commission on the draft budgetary plans and on the budg-
etary situation and prospect in the euro area, the results of those discussions of the Eu-
rogroup shall be made public ‘where appropriate’ (Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013). This means that it is hard for the European Parliament to get the information, 
which enables it to effectively control the European Council and the Eurogroup by asking the 
right questions to their presidents when they appear in front of the competent committee. 
 
In sum, the European Parliament has sufficient access to information from the core institu-
tions in economic policy coordination such as the Commission and the Council. As regards 
information relating to macroeconomic adjustment programmes, the information obligations 
of the European Commission under Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 cannot be considered as 
forming foundations of accountability. Both provisions in the regulation require from the chair 
and the vice-chairs of the competent committee to treat the information received ‘as confi-
dential’, which means that the European Commission cannot be held accountable on the basis 
of this information.  
 
The access to information from the European Council and from the Eurogroup is too limited 
in order to enable the European Parliament to properly control the activities of both. This 
limited access to information combined with a lack of transparency does not reflect in the 
case of the Eurogroup its growing role in the economic governance of the Eurozone. Hence, 
already on the basis of the required foundations of accountability, the European Council and 
                                           
15 Article 2-ab of Regulation (EU) No (EC) No 1466/97 (as regards the preventive arm of the SGP), Article 2a of 
Regulation (EU) No (EC) No 1467/97 (as regards the corrective arm of the SGP), Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 
(EU) No 1176/2011 and Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No (EU) No 1174/2011 (as regards macroeconomic imbalances). 
16 Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No (EU) No 473/2013 (as regards assessing draft budgetary plans). 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
46 
 
the Eurogroup cannot be considered to be properly held to account for their activities within 
EMU by the European Parliament. 
4.1.2.2. Instruments of accountability 
Information forming the foundations of accountability put the controlling body in a position 
to form a judgment about the outcome of the activities of the controlled bodies, their perfor-
mance and their behaviour. Proper accountability now requires that the controlling body has 
effective instruments at its disposal in order to assign consequences to its judgment. Other-
wise, the accountability framework is incomplete. 
 
When it comes to the possibilities for the European Parliament to assign consequences to a 
judgment about the activities of the Union in EMU matters, the European Parliament has 
some instruments, mainly vis-à-vis the European Commission. The main instrument is the 
Parliament’s ex post influence on shaping and modifying the legal base and the procedures, 
based on which in particular the European Commission and the Council act. This refers to the 
secondary law, which is adopted on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU. This instrument is, 
however, dependent on a legislative initiative by the European Commission, which the Euro-
pean Parliament can only request on the basis of a legislative own initiative report under 
Article 225 TFEU without any obligation for the Commission to follow this request. Powers 
and procedures foreseen by Primary law (Article 121(2)-(5) TFEU, Article 126 TFEU) are 
excluded from this instrument. The European Parliament can therefore not override decisions 
and policy choices made within the economic policy coordination. It is formally not included 
in the adoption of the ‘broad guidelines’, of the annual growth survey, which forms the bench-
mark for the European semester, and of the country-specific recommendations. By that, the 
possibility to influence the procedures on the basis of Article 121(6) TFEU is only of minor 
significance. 
 
Furthermore, the European Parliament may table a motion of censure on the activities of the 
Commission, in accordance with Article 234 TFEU, if it considers misbehaviour of the Com-
mission in EMU matters of such a gravity that it justifies such a motion. Besides, the European 
Parliament may also raise its veto against the Union’s annual budget, in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 314 TFEU, or adopt amendments of the Union’s annual budget 
concerning budget lines relating to EMU. Those instruments, even though they are at the 
disposal of the European Parliament, appear not to be suitable to be considered as proper 
instruments of accountability. This is because of the high political costs that are in reality 
attached to the use of those instruments. The veto against the Union’s annual budget as well 
as a motion of censure on the activities of the Commission requires severe violations of Union 
objectives and aims in order to be used. 
 
In sum, the European Parliament has little instruments of accountability. The Presidents of 
the Council, the European Council and the Eurogroup have not be afraid of any negative 
consequences with regard to their person. The only inconvenience for them is the obligation 
to appear in front of the competent committee and to stand questions asked by MEPs. Policy 
choices and individual decisions with regard to specific Member States cannot be overruled 
by the European Parliament. The approval of the European Parliament for financial assistance 
measures is not required.  
4.1.2.3. Conclusion 
The Economic Dialogue is the only forum of accountability besides the standard accountability 
instruments of the European Parliament such as the set up a of temporary committee of 
inquiry, a motion of censure or the veto of the Union budget. There is only a comprehensive 
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obligation to inform the European Parliament on the parts of the European Commission and 
to a somewhat lesser extent on the parts of the Council. There are only minor information 
obligations on the parts of the European Council and the Eurogroup. The lack of transparency 
of the activities of the latter leads to conclusion that with regard to the European Council and 
the Eurogroup a proper accountability lacks already at the level of foundations of accounta-
bility. With regard to the Commission and the Council, the European Parliament has enough 
of information for a judgment about their performance, but no effective instruments to assign 
consequences to its judgment. Based on these considerations, one must conclude that the 
accountability of the Union in EMU matters has to be considered precarious. 
4.2. Enhancing the accountability of the Eurogroup 
In view of the strong de facto role of the Eurogroup, which goes beyond the original idea 
behind the Treaty and Protocol rules that were drafted for it, (cf. section 1.1.5) especially the 
accountability of the Eurogroup has to be enhanced in terms of foundations of accountability 
as in terms of instruments of accountability. 
 
As regards foundations of accountability, the ‘Six Pack’ and the ‘Two Pack’ regulations could 
be amended in order to extend the obligation to regularly inform the European Parliament to 
the Eurogroup. Furthermore, in order to increase transparency of the Eurogroup, it could be 
included into Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regard public access to documents. In order to 
overcome the exception to public access laid down in Article 4 of this regulation, an agree-
ment between the European Parliament and the Eurogroup could be concluded outlining ac-
cess to documents and information for the European Parliament. 
 
Since the Eurogroup is legally an informal body, most of the instruments of accountability 
cannot be applied to it without changing it into a formal body, which would require a Treaty 
change. Below the threshold of a Treaty change would be a merger of an existing position, 
which can already be held to account by the European Parliament, with the position of the 
president of the Eurogroup. Article 2 of Protocol (No 14) on the Eurogroup states that only 
the ministers of the Member States shall elect a president and that the president is to be 
elected by a majority of Member States. It does, however, not provide for any specific criteria 
for the selection of the president. The president is therefore not limited to ministers of Mem-
ber States. Otherwise, the wording of Article 2 should contain a formulation such as ‘amongst 
them’. By that, also the Commissioner responsible EMU affairs could be elected as president 
of the Eurogroup without a Treaty change. The commissioner can then as a part of the college 
of commissioners be held accountable by the European Parliament. 
 
Beyond the threshold of a Treaty change, the Eurogroup should be formalised with a presi-
dent that has to be elected by the European Parliament. Such an elected president could be, 
following the model of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, member of the Commission and, within the Commission, be responsible for EMU af-
fairs and preside the ECOFIN council. Such a concentration of power would, however, require 
that this person can be held responsible for his/her action (including a motion of censure) 
outside of the collective responsibility of the European Commission as a college under Article 
234 TFEU. Furthermore, a formalisation of the Eurogroup would lead to an own budget of the 
Eurogroup, which would be financed by the Union budget and which would, by that, open up 
the possibility to the European Parliament to control the activities of the Eurogroup via its 
budget control. 
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4.3. Enhancing instruments of accountability for the European 
Parliament 
4.3.1. Inclusion of the Parliament into the decision of policy choices: Extension of the 
ordinary legislative procedure to matters of economic and fiscal affairs 
A coordination of national economic and fiscal policies can not only be achieved by means of 
the European semester without formal involvement of the European Parliament in the adop-
tion of policy choices but also by the harmonisation of important areas of economic and fiscal 
policies such as tax law (on the basis of Article 113 concerning indirect taxes and of Article 
115 TFEU concerning direct taxes) and social law (on the basis of Article 153 TFEU). Yet all 
those legal bases only provide for a consultation of the European Parliament. The ordinary 
legislative procedure can, however, be extended to these legal bases either by the simplified 
treaty amendment procedure (Article 48(7)(2) TEU) or by making use of Article 333(2) TFEU 
which enables the Council to switch for the purpose of an enhanced cooperation to the ordi-
nary legislative procedure. 
4.3.2. Making use of interinstitutional agreements 
Participation rights of the European Parliament can be strengthened by introducing a ‘de-
facto co-decision’ in EMU matters via interinstitutional agreements under Article 295 TFEU. 
The exclusion of the European Parliament only covers all procedural steps after the adoption 
of the proposal for a decision or the recommendation for a recommendation by the European 
Commission. The Treaty is, however, silent as regards Parliamentary involvement before the 
vote in the college of Commissioners. Against this background, the Commission could inform 
the European Parliament about its draft proposals or draft recommendations to the Council 
before their adoption by the Commission. The European Parliament could then draft amend-
ments to this draft, which the European Commission could include into its proposals or rec-
ommendations before it submits them to the Council. Such a procedure could be established 
on the basis of an interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the 
Commission. An example for a comparable extension of Parliamentary participation rights 
can be found in paragraph 16 of the interinstitutional agreement between the Parliament and 
the Commission ([2010] OJ L 304, 47) on the de facto initiative right of the European Parlia-
ment. 
4.3.3. Conclusion of an agreement with the ESM 
The ESM is currently considered as being a body outside of the EU accountability framework, 
wherefore there is no obligation for the ESM to inform the European Parliament or to appear 
in front of the competent committee. The ESM is only supervised by the European Parliament 
indirectly by controlling the European Commission in executing tasks mandated by the ESM. 
In order to enhance direct accountability of the ESM vis-à-vis the European Parliament, on 
the basis of Article 38 of the ESM-Treaty, the ESM could formalise its cooperation with the 
European Parliament and grant it the status of a permanent observer in the ESM Board of 
Governors and the Board of Directors. 
4.3.4. The democratic potential of Union agencies 
Dealing with the consequences of the recent financial and economic crisis and drawing the 
conclusions from its reasons and its development in order to prevent a reoccurrence of such 
a crisis revealed the limits of the mere European harmonisation of Member States’ laws. In 
areas where even before the crisis harmonised rules existed, uneven application of these 
rules by national authorities lead to weaknesses in the economic and financial supervisory 
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system and undermined the purpose of the harmonisation measures. Based on this observa-
tion, the Union legislator realised a growing necessity not only to harmonise Member States’ 
rules but also Member States’ executive action, as can be seen with the conferral of imple-
menting powers on the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) by Article 28 of 
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (prohibition of ‘short selling’). 
 
This harmonisation of implementing powers raised accountability questions. In principle, as 
repeated by Article 291(1) TFEU, Member States have to implement harmonised rules within 
their territory. Implementing authorities are then subject to the accountability, mechanisms 
foreseen by national law and are accountable to the national Parliament. Where, however, 
uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts may 
confer implementing powers on the Commission or on the Council. (Article 291(2) TFEU). In 
those situations, Article 291(3) TFEU makes clear that the Member States control the Com-
mission’s exercise of implementing powers. The European Parliament and the Council may 
only lay down general principles for this control, but they are not entrusted with this control. 
Furthermore, as shown above, the European Parliament has only instruments for the control 
of the European Commission at its disposal that have high political costs (such as the motion 
of censure or the veto against the Union budget). Such instruments are not suitable for the 
control of implementing powers. In this context, veto powers against certain decisions and 
inquiry rights with regard to certain decisions are more effective instruments. 
 
The conferral of implementing powers on Union agencies, as confirmed by the ECJ in case C-
270/12, United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council (‘short selling case’), gives the 
opportunity to the European Parliament to strengthen its democratic control in EMU matters. 
In the ‘short selling case’ the ECJ modified its so-called ‘Meroni doctrine’ (established in ECJ 
1957 and 1958) on the conferral of implementing powers on Union agencies. Whilst the orig-
inal Meroni doctrine wanted to prevent the conferral of executive powers delegated by Pri-
mary law to the European Commission on bodies that are not subject to any kind of legal 
control, the Meroni doctrine, as modified by the ECJ in the ‘short selling case’, addresses the 
issue of conferral of executive powers delegated by the Union legislator to Union agencies by 
means of secondary law. As under the original Meroni doctrine, the modified Meroni doctrine 
seeks to prevent the conferral of executive powers outside of the scope of control. Whilst the 
conditions and the limits of the executive powers have to be defined (and thus controlled) by 
the Union legislator, the use of these powers is subject to judicial review by the European 
courts. The latter is realised by the Lisbon Treaty subjecting the acts of Union agencies to 
the action of annulment (Article 263 TFEU) and to the action for failure to act (Article 265 
TFEU). The first is addressed by the judgment. It requires ‘clearly defined executive powers’ 
(para. 41) in the delegating act, which are to be set by the Union legislator. Such clear 
definitions may include discretion. The limits for the conferral of discretion are, however, 
crossed when the legislator delegates ‘political choices falling within the responsibilities of 
the European Union legislature’ (ECJ 2012a: para 65). This shows that, when conferring 
implementing powers on Union agencies, the Union legislator may not renounce its political 
responsibility. On the contrary, it has to provide for effective means to control the use of the 
conferred powers. The more discretionary the conferred powers are, the more intense the 
supervision of the Union legislator has to be in order to meet the criterion set by the ECJ that 
the Union legislator may not delegate political choices to Union agencies. In sum, the Meroni 
doctrine has to be read as to prohibit any kind of transfer of implementing powers into an 
area without effective legal and political control of the use of these implementing powers. 
Political control has to be defined by the legal act conferring these powers upon the Union 
agency. 
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This shows that the conferral of implementing powers on Union agencies allows the Union 
legislator to establish an accountability mechanism in relation to these Union agencies where 
the Union body is accountable to the Union legislator, in contrast to Article 291(2) TFEU 
where the European Commission is to be held to account by the Member States. Defining an 
accountability mechanism in secondary law also gives the opportunity to include customised 
instruments of accountability. The political costs for using such instruments may, by that, be 
lower compared to the instruments of accountability that the European Parliament has vis-
à-vis the European Commission. Such instruments may cover the appointment and the dis-
missal of the managing staff of the agency, participation in the supervisory board of the 
agency, veto rights in relation to certain agency decisions, information obligations and trans-
parency rules, budgetary rights in relation to the agency’s budget. 
 
These means for a proper foundation of accountability and these instruments for accounta-
bility can be included in the legal act conferring the powers on the Union agency and, by that, 
on the basis of existing Treaty competences. Furthermore, it may be considered to adopt a 
framework regulation applicable to all agencies, which are equipped with implementing pow-
ers, following the model of Regulation (EC) No 58/2003, based on Article 352(1) TFEU. This 
framework regulation could then include a general accountability mechanism based on the 
just outlined principles and ideas. Such a framework regulation could then lead to an increase 
of accountability and democratic legitimacy of the use of implementing powers at EU level. 
4.3.5. Proposals for establishing a new parliamentary body in Eurozone matters 
As a reaction to the lack of legitimacy and accountability of decisions taken within EMU, the 
establishment of a new parliamentary body in Eurozone matters were out forward. These 
proposals are based on the assumption that Eurozone matters do not concern the entire EU 
at first sight, but only those Member States whose currency is the Euro. Therefore, for those 
who put forward these proposals, the question arose whether the entire European Parliament 
can be the right institution to legitimise measures in Eurozone matters. Instead of vesting 
the European Parliament with additional instruments of accountability and to strengthen its 
information gathering rights, it was proposed to establish a new parliamentary body for the 
Eurozone, which is composed by members of national parliaments: the Euro-Chamber. 
4.3.5.1. Establishment of a new parliamentary body for the Eurozone (partly) composed 
of members of national parliaments from Eurozone Member States 
Such a chamber would establish a third decision-making body next to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council. It appears comparable to the European Parliament before its first direct 
election in 1979. It can therefore be considered as a step back in the parliamentarisation of 
the EU. Furthermore, national parliamentarians act in the national interest. If we try to inte-
grate the Euro-Chamber into the system of Union institutions, it rather belongs next to the 
Council representing the Member States than next to the European Parliament representing 
the Union citizens. A Euro-Chamber could therefore maybe decide instead of the Council, in 
the composition of the Eurozone Member States, but not instead of the entire European Par-
liament. 
4.3.5.2. Limiting voting rights within the European Parliament to Eurozone MEPs 
Furthermore, it was suggested to limit voting rights within the European Parliament to Euro-
zone MEPs (Future of Europe Group, Final Report, 5). The treaties do not provide for such a 
limitation of voting rights. Whilst in an enhanced cooperation the voting rights in the Council 
are limited to the participating Member States (Article 330 TFEU), no such limitation can be 
found with regard to the European Parliament. The same applies to Article 136 TFEU on 
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provisions specific to Eurozone Member States. This suggestion, furthermore, ignores the 
fact that the Euro is the currency of the Union and not of a subgroup of Member States. 
Decisions concerning the currency of the Union should be taken in the Union's interest, which 
is represented by the entire European Parliament. Finally, the limitation of voting rights in 
relation to the origin of a MEP runs counter to the fundamental EU principle of prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
4.3.5.3. Establishment of an EP Committee on Eurozone affairs with decision-making 
rights on behalf of the European Parliament 
Rather than obliging the European Parliament to limit the voting rights of its members, it 
may also establish a Committee on Eurozone affairs with decision-making rights on behalf of 
the European Parliament.17 This idea copies Article 45 of the German Fundamental Law at EU 
level. Whilst it does not cut back any rights of the European Parliament and leaves it at the 
Parliament’s discretion on how to establish such a committee, the idea ignores the need for 
a better inclusion of national parliaments in Eurozone matters. 
  
                                           
17 Sarrazin, ‘The case for democratic economic governance in the EU-27’. 
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF LEGAL BASES 
Legal base Secondary law based on it 
Art. 121(6) TFEU Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic 
and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area 
experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect 
to their financial stability 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring 
the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the 
euro area  
Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures 
to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies 
Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies 
Art. 122(2) TFEU Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism 
Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1360 of 4 August 2015 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism 
Art. 125(2) TFEU Council Regulation (EC) No 3604/93 of 13 December 1993 
specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition of 
privileged access referred to in Article 104a of the Treaty 
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Legal base Secondary law based on it 
 Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 
specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty 
Art. 126(14)(2) TFEU Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
Art. 126(14)(3) TFEU Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States 
Council Regulation (EU) No 679/2010 of 26 July 2010 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 as regards the quality of statistical 
data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure 
Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the 
application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure 
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1222/2004 of 28 June 2004 
concerning the compilation and transmission of data on the 
quarterly government debt 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on 
the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure 
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 of 12 December 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 as regards the quality of 
statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure 
Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000 of 28 February 2000 
amending Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 on the application of the 
Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the 
Treaty establishing the European Community 
Art. 127(6) TFEU Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 
conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010 
conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank 
concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board 
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Legal base Secondary law based on it 
Art. 128(2) TFEU Council Regulation (EU) No 729/2014 of 24 June 2014 on 
denominations and technical specifications of euro coins 
intended for circulation 
Art. 129(3) TFEU (not used) 
Art. 129(4) TFEU Council Regulation (EC) No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 
concerning the collection of statistical information by the 
European Central Bank 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998 
concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose 
sanctions 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 of 23 November 1998 
concerning the application of minimum reserves by the 
European Central Bank 
Council Regulation (EC) No 134/2002 of 22 January 2002 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 concerning the 
application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank 
Art. 133 TFEU Regulation (EU) No 651/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 July 2012 on the issuance of euro coins 
Regulation (EU) No 1214/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the professional cross-
border transport of euro cash by road between euro-area 
Member States 
Regulation (EU) No 1210/2010 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 December 2010 concerning authentication 
of euro coins and handling of euro coins unfit for circulation 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2169/2005 of 21 December 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the 
euro 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2182/2004 of 6 December 2004 
concerning medals and tokens similar to euro coins 
Council Regulation (EC) No 46/2009 of 18 December 2008 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2182/2004 concerning medals 
and tokens similar to euro coins 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1338/2001 of 28 June 2001 laying 
down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against 
counterfeiting 
Art. 136(1) TFEU Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic 
and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area 
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Legal base Secondary law based on it 
experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect 
to their financial stability 
Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring 
the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the 
euro area 
Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures 
to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area 
Art. 138(1) TFEU (not used) 
Art. 143(2) TFEU Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 
establishing a facility providing medium-term financial 
assistance for Member States' balances of payments 
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ANNEX 2: PROPOSAL FOR TREATY CHANGES 
Provision Proposed Treaty change 
Article 13 TEU Inclusion of the ESM/EMF as an own institution into the list 
of Union institutions 
Motivation: As explained in section 3.3, the inclusion of the 
ESM into the EU legal framework require a governance 
structure, which goes beyond the legal possibilities under 
the existing Treaties. It is therefore recommendable to 
include the ESM/EMF as an own institution into the Treaties. 
new Article 18a TEU Inclusion of an own provision for the Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs with a description of the 
tasks and the election procedure in the EP 
Motivation: A Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, who presides the ECOFIN and the Eurogroup, who is 
responsible for the fiscal capacity is a strong commissioner 
that should be elected separately from the college of 
Commissioners and should be held to account as a person 
Article 16(9) TEU Adaptation of this provision to the Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs comparable to the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Motivation: Necessary adaptation if a new Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, who presides the ECOFIN 
and the Eurogroup, who is responsible for the fiscal 
capacity, should be introduced. Article 16(9) TEU refers to 
the presidencies of the Council configurations. 
Article 17 TEU Adaptation of this provision to the Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs comparable to the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Motivation: Necessary adaptation if a new Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, who presides the ECOFIN 
and the Eurogroup, who is responsible for the fiscal 
capacity, should be introduced 
Article 21(3) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Motivation: in order to allow for harmonisation of social laws 
Article 113 TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Motivation: in order to allow for harmonisation of indirect 
taxes 
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Provision Proposed Treaty change 
Article 115 TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure and replacing ‘directives’ by 
‘measures’  
Motivation: in order to allow for harmonisation of direct tax 
laws and in order to enable the Union legislator to make use 
of all possible measures foreseen by Article 288 TFEU 
Article 121(2)(3) TFEU Replacing the decision-making procedure of the ‘broad 
guidelines’ by the ordinary legislative procedure 
Motivation: the European Parliament and the Council should 
adopt, in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the policy goals for the economic policy 
coordination 
new Article 121(5) TFEU Including a new decision-making procedure for the 
measures adopted under the multilateral surveillance 
procedure: The Commission proposal shall be 
communicated to the European Parliament; the European 
Parliament may propose amendments to the Commission 
proposal; the European Parliament’s amendments shall be 
deemed accepted by the European Commission if it does 
not deliver a negative opinion; in case of a negative 
Commission opinion, the Council may reject the European 
Parliament’s amendments when adopting the Commission 
proposal. 
Motivation: This proposal follows Article 220(5) of the 
Fundamental Law of the European Union by the Spinelli 
Group. It includes the European Parliament in the decision-
making procedure without thwarting a quick and efficient 
decision-making. The proposed procedure guarantees full 
involvement of the European Parliament. 
new Article 121(6) TFEU Inclusion of sanctions in case of non-compliance with EU 
2020 targets  
Motivation: Legal base for sanctions has to be explicitly 
provided by the Treaties 
new Article 121(7) TFEU Introduction of the reverse majority rule into the decision 
making process which includes an intervention right the EP 
Motivation: A change of the voting modalities in the Council, 
set by Article 16(3) TEU, requires a Treaty change 
Article 121(5) TFEU Including the Presidents of the Eurogroup and the President 
of the European Council as addressees of the information 
obligation 
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Provision Proposed Treaty change 
Motivation: Enhancing the foundations of accountability with 
regard to the European Council and the Eurogroup 
Article 125(1) TFEU Inclusion of common debts with joint and several liability 
and of the European Redemption Fund as an exception 
within Article 125(1) TFEU 
Motivation: Legal certainty with regard to common debt and 
the establishment of a European Redemption Fund 
Article 125(2) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Article 126(10) TFEU Deletion of the exclusion of jurisdiction of the ECJ  
Motivation: Giving the European Commission together with 
the ECJ a stronger role to supervise Member States 
new Article 126(11a) TFEU Inclusion of the debt brake (integration of the TSCG) 
Article 126(12) TFEU Inclusion of the reverse qualified majority-voting rule for all 
decisions taken within Art. 126 TFEU (integration of the 
TSCG)  
Motivation: A change of the voting modalities in the Council, 
set by Article 16(3) TEU, requires a Treaty change 
Article 126(14)(2) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Article 126(14)(3) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Article 127(6) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Article 129(4) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Article 136(1) TFEU Deleting the formulations ‘in accordance with the relevant 
provisions’ and ‘in accordance with the relevant procedure 
from among those referred to Articles 121 and 126, with 
the exception of the procedure set out in Article 126(14)’. 
Motivation: Article 136(1) TFEU currently refers to the 
framework set by Articles 121 and 126 TFEU. The adoption 
of legal acts of the euro area Member States outside of the 
scope of application of these two Articles is not allowed 
under Article 136(1) TFEU. If Article 136(1) TFEU should be 
used in order to adopt far-reaching special rules for the 
euro area, the limitations set by this article should be 
deleted. 
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Provision Proposed Treaty change 
Article 136(3) TFEU Inclusion of the Union into the derogation norm and 
reference to a new protocol on the ESM/EMF (integration of 
the ESM-Treaty) 
new Article 136(4) TFEU Inclusion of a new legal base to establish a fiscal capacity of 
the Member States whose currency is the euro 
new Article 137a TFEU Inclusion of the Euro Summit (integration of the TSCG) 
including the mandatory participation of the president of the 
European Parliament 
new Article 148(5) TFEU Inclusion of sanctions in case of non-compliance with EU 
2020 targets  
Motivation: Legal base for sanctions has to be explicitly 
provided by the Treaties 
new Article 148(6) TFEU Introduction of the reverse majority rule into the decision 
making process which includes an intervention right the EP 
Motivation: A change of the voting modalities in the Council, 
set by Article 16(3) TEU, requires a Treaty change 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU Extension of the possibility to set minimum requirements to 
all fields covered by 153(1) (deletion of the restriction to 
para. 1(a) to (i)) 
Motivation: in order to allow for harmonisation of social laws 
Article 153(2)(b) TFEU Inclusion of the possibility to set minimum requirements by 
means of regulation 
Motivation: in order to allow for harmonisation of social laws 
Article 153(2)(3) TFEU Deletion of the special legislative procedure and of the 
restrictions for the ordinary legislative procedure 
Article 246 TFEU Adaptation of this provision to the new Commissioner 
comparably to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy 
Motivation: Necessary adaptation if a new Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, who presides the ECOFIN 
and the Eurogroup, who is responsible for the fiscal 
capacity, should be introduced 
Article 248 TFEU Adaptation of this provision to the new Commissioner 
comparably to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy 
Motivation: Necessary adaptation if a new Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, who presides the ECOFIN 
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Provision Proposed Treaty change 
and the Eurogroup, who is responsible for the fiscal 
capacity, should be introduced 
Article 311(3) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
Article 311(4) TFEU Replacing the special legislative procedure by the ordinary 
legislative procedure 
new Article 311a TFEU Inclusion of a legal base for establishing new categories of 
own resources with respect to Member States whose 
currency is the euro; revenue from these own resources 
shall be earmarked for expenditure with respect to the euro 
area (such as the fiscal capacity). 
Motivation: special rules for euro area Member States 
should lead to the creation of a euro area budget within the 
Union budget. 
Protocol on the Eurogroup Inclusion of the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs who acts as the president of the Eurogroup 
 
 
  
Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – Improving functioning of the EU: Economic and Monetary Policy 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
61 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 Amtenbrink, Fabian (1999), The democratic accountability of central banks – A 
comparative study of the European Central Bank, Oxford 1999 
 Amtenbrink, Fabian (2012), “Towards an Index for Accountability of Informal 
International Lawmakers?” in: Pauwelyn, Joost, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters, 
Informal International Lawmaking, Oxford 2012, p. 335. 
 Amtenbrink, Fabian and René Repasi (2016), “Compliance and Enforcement in Economic 
Policy Coordination in EMU”, in: András Jakab and Dimitry Kochenov, The Enforcement of 
EU Law and Values, Oxford 2016, forthcoming 
 Börzel, Tanja A., Tobias Hofmann and Carina Sprungk, “Why Do State not Obey the Law? 
Lessons from the European Union”, Paper prepared for the EUSA Conference, Nashville, 
March 27-30, 2003 
 Bovens, Mark (2007), “New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance”, (2007) 
Comparative European Politics 5, p. 104. 
 Enderlein, Hendrik and Jörg Haas (2015), “What would a European Finance Minister do? 
A proposal”, Policy Paper No. 145, Jacques Delors Institut, October 2015. 
 European Court of Justice (1958), Case 9/56, Meroni v High Authority [1958] ECR 11 
 European Court of Justice (1981), Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom [1981] 
ECR 1045 
 European Court of Justice (1995), Case C-21/94 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-1827 
 European Court of Justice (1997), Case C-392/95, Parliament v Council [1997] ECR I-
3212 
 European Court of Justice (2004), Case C-27/04, Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-
6649 
 European Court of Justice (2010a), Case C-246/07, Commission v Sweden [2010] ECR I-
3317 
 European Court of Justice (2010b), Case C-290/07 P, Commission v Scott SA [2010] ECR 
I-7763 
 European Court of Justice (2012a), Judgment of 5 September 2012, Case C-355/10, 
European Parliament v Council 
 European Court of Justice (2012b), Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, 
Pringle 
 European Court of Justice (2013), Judgment of 16 April 2013, Joined Cases C-274/11 and 
C-295/11, Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European Union 
 European Court of Justice (2014), Judgment of 22 January 2014, Case C-270/12, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament, Council of the 
European Union 
  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
62 
 
 European Parliament (2011), European Parliament resolution of 23 March 2011 on the 
draft European Council decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose 
currency is the euro, P7_TA(2011)0103 
 European Parliament (2013), European Parliament resolution of 12 December 2013 on 
constitutional problems of a multitier governance in the European Union, 
P7_TA(2013)0598 
 Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills (2014), Final Report, 31 March 
2014 
 General Court (2014), orders of 16 October 2014, Case T-327/13 Mallis and Malli v 
European Commission and European Central Bank, Case T-328/13 Tameio Pronoias 
Prosopikou Trapezis Kyprou v European Commission and European Central Bank, Case T-
329/13 Petros Chatzithoma and Ellenitsa Chatzithoma v European Commission and 
European Central Bank, Case T-330/13 Lella Chatziioannou v European Commission and 
European Central Bank and Case T-331/13 Marinos Nicolaou v European Commission and 
European Central Bank 
 Häde, Ulrich (2011), “Rechtsfragen der EU-Rettungsschirme”, Zeitschrift für 
Gesetzgebung 2011, p. 1 
 Kilponen, Juha, Helinä Laakkonen and Jouko Vilmunen (2015), “Sovereign Risk, European 
Crisis-Resolution Policies, and Bond Spreads”, International Journal of Central Banking 
2015, p. 285 
 Raustiala, Kal and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance”, in: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, Handbook of 
International Relations, London 2002, p. 538 
 Repasi, René (2013), “Völkervertragliche Freiräume für EU-Mitgliedstaaten”, Europarecht 
2013, p. 45 
 Sachverständigenrat (2011), “Assume responsibility for Europe”, Annual Report 2011/12 
 Schorkopf, Frank (2012), “Verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen und Möglichkeiten für eine 
Umsetzung des Schuldentilgungspaktes des Sachverständigenrates”, Expertise 
commissioned by the German Council of Economic Experts, 2012. 
 Sherpas (2015), “Contributions from the Sherpas to the Five Presidents' Report”, Second 
Contribution, 2015. 
 Strauss-Kahn, Dominique (1999), “Sur les objectifs du pacte européen pour l’emploi, avec 
des suggestions operationnelles”, Europe Documents, Edition française, No. 2135, 
24.4.1999 
 Van Rompuy, Herman (2012), “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union” 
Brussels, 26 June 2012 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131201.pdf) 
 
 

